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Photogmphic 

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HISTORICAL  DETAILS, 

HAVING  RELATION   TO   THB 

CAMPAIGN  OF   Tifis   NORTH- WESTEEN 

ARMY, 

UNDER  GENERALS  HARRISON  AND  WINCHESTER, 

DURING*  THE  WINTEE   OF  1812-lS. 

T0O£TU£U   WITH 


\ 


ii 


SOME  PARTICULARS 

RELATING   TO    TBB 


SVRUE^BEU  OF  FORT  BOJVFEMt  m.   ; 


•w 


ft*. 


«** 


" Truth, 

"  That  fears  no  frowns,  and  seeks  no  blind  applause." 

SarhnU  Conspiracy  <f  tHnffk' 


LEXINGTON  K. 

PRIJfTED  BY  WORSLEY  &  SMTTa 
4818. 


t«i***^ 


/ 


1p»- 


I 


■'"*  -i«~_^  ._,*-'a)i._ 


'f^t\ 


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f^mmmmmm 


TO  THE  CITIZEJ^S  OF  THE  UJ^ITED  STATES, 

In  conformity  with  the  opinion  of  the  friends  of  general 
Winchester,  that  news-paper  publications  are  not  of  a  nature  to 
conect  errors  which  nave  assumed  the  character  of  History, 
the  editor  of  this  work  has  by  permission  collected  (h?  Num- 
ijKiis  of  his  appeal—and,  after  amplifying  them  with  documen- 
tary statements,  received  from  the  General,  and  never  before 
submitted  to  the  public,  presents  them  in  this  embodied  form  to 

his  fellow-citizens. 

EDITOR. 

Tennessee,  1818^ 


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III  .''1^ 


HISTORICAL  DETAILS,  &e, 


JVO.  J. 

TO    THE    EDITORS   OP   THE    NATIONAL   INTELLIOKNOER. 

Gentlemen —  -  ,     t    » 

A  WORK,  purporting  to  be  a  «  History  of  the  Late 
War  in  tlie  Western  Country,"  in  which  my  name  is 
mentioned  with  some  asperity,  and  perhaps  with  some 
injustice,  has  lately  made  its  appearance  in  this  part  of 
the  world.— Had  not  this  production  some  claim  to  the 
attention  of  posterity,  I  could  suffer  ••  of  it  which 

has  rehUion  to  the  disasters  of  the  1  *  ♦he  North 

Western  Army,  to  pass  without  a  I  could 

rely  upon  future  historians  to  judgf  'ord  dis- 

passionately, those  events,  and  the  caust. .         h  opera- 
ted in  their  production.     But,  under  existing  ^Arcura- 
stances,  silence  would  be  criminal  as  respects  myself, 
my  family,  my  country.    It  would  sanction  the  errors 
or  mistakes  of  that  history,  and  consign  my  name,  not 
to  oblivion,  but  infamy.     I  cannot  wish  to  charge  the 
author  of  the  work  under  consideration,  with  intentional 
deviation  from  torrectness.    The  name  Hiatonan  is  sa- 
cred.    1  revere  it.    I  vener:  te  it  as  the  ordeal,  which, 
when  the  passions  and  prejudices  of  meu  become  ex- 
tinct by  the  operation  of  time,  is  competent  to  the  re- 
demption of  integrity  from  the  imputation  of  dishonor. 
1  am  unwilling,  from  the  respect  to  which  human  nature 
is  entitled,  to  suppose  that  tlie  name  HiJorian  can  be 
assumed  for  the  p' rpose  of  acfiuiring  literary  fame,  or 


JU. 


{ 


0 


niSTORICAL  DKTAIT.S. 


to  sarrifice  tlie  reputation  of  one  individual  to  ilmt  of 
another. 

I  am  not  untwarc  of  (||c  rfiflic„|ti.,  atl-n.Iine  an  at- 
temi.t  at  I  ,c  reversal  nf  ,,nl.lic  .cnliment.    I  am  to..  «ell 
acquamte.  «U h  the  operati.u,  of  human  passions,  to  in- 
dulse  so  delusive  a  liope.     I  have,  live.l  t,.o  long  not  |o 
ave  .l,scove.e,!,  tlmt  mankind  generally  .,,p„rUo„  the 
.legree  of  n,er,t  to  the  degree  of  success-i„d  wh'Ut 
admittins  ,.    '.  be  a  g«„l  criterion,  I  must  contend,  that 
t  IS  not  ahvajs  just.    Many  a  statesman  has  heen  eu- 
ogized,  I,y  the  generation  in  which  he  lived,  and  caused 
as  name  to  be  transmitted  to  posterity,  the  consumma- 
tiOB  of  .vnose  pmns  resulted  more  from  favwahle  cir- 
cumstances, than  perspicacity,  or  the  exercise  of  poliU- 
cat  ,v,sd«.n.    Many  a  hero  has  immortalized  his  name 
whose  success  in  „,.««  depended  more  on  accident  than 
on  the  perfection  of  military  arrangement :  and.  ho«r 
Many  statesmen  an.l  heroes  have  fallen  from  the  pinna- 
de  of  polmcal  and  military  glory,  in  consequence  of  the 
supervention  of  obstacles  which  could  neither  he  fore 
seen  nor  avoided  ?  Yet,  with  these  lessons  before  us,  iu 
a.most  every  mslance,  we  apportion  the  degree  of  merit 

Power,  who  regulates  tin-  universe,  have  we  any  pre- 
tensions  to  the  exercise  of  justice !  are  we  rational ' 
Neither  maldng  comparisons  with,  „„r  having  any 

V  ir^s^?'"'?'  "'y '""''"'••'-'vl.athas  become  of 

A  t  mr  gtdair,  .,f  unfortunate  memory?  Have  his  sen- 

dUies  under  the  pressure  of  misfort,.„e,  been  treated 

i>.th  tenderness-with  common  humanity_or  his  grey 

.airs  with  respect?  Was  Napoleon  Bonaparte.  nf7a 

forlorn  and  abandoned  exile  at  St.  Helena;  Ies.s  a  gene 


'■^If 


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J 


HISTORICAL  DETAILS.  7 

i-al  at  Mounl  St.  John  or  Waterlm»,  than  when  he  wa- 
di'd  to  victory  and  tite.  pinr»acle  of  military  r^iown, 
-through  the  blood  of  Marengo  and  Auslerlitz?  Did  the 
reversal  of  the  attainder  of  Algernon  Sidney,  by  act  of 
parliament,  malie  him  a  greater  or  a  better  man,  than 
he  was  when  .ironght  to  the  block,  slaggering  nnder  a 
load  of  infamy,  cast  upon  him  by  the  judgment  and  sen- 
tence  of  Jeffries?  wj^en,  in  truth,  his  intrinsic  worth, 
and  bis  services  to  the  human  race,  should  have  clothed 
his  memory  with  in  aortal  fame— and  "  shed  a  splen- 
dor round  the  horrors  of  his  grave." 

B.it  to  appreciate  man  by  reverses,  is  neither  :■;»» 
greatest  misfortune  nor  the  grealest  injustice  to  which 
men  in  pul)lic  life  are  8u!,ject.    With  the  generality  of 
mankind,  to  want  success  is  tc   want  integrity.     TSic 
statesman  who  fails  to  consummate  his  plans,  no  matter 
what  meana  may  be  put  within  his  grasp,  is  aCataUne : 
and  the  general  whos.i  destiny  is  disaHtrons,  without  a 
dispassionate  investigation  either  of  his  me-ns  of  pre- 
venting misfortune  or  his  motives  for  acting,  is  stigma- 
tized with  the  epithet  of  traitor !    In  time  of  war,  when 
there  exists  a  great  degree  of  public  excitement,  our  ex- 
pectations are  s-^ldom  reasonable.     Achievements  avo 
anticipated  without  a  consideration  of  the  insurmounta- 
ble barriers  which  frequently  oppose  thfmsplves— and. 
the  measure  of  our  expectations  is,  not  what  we  have 
put  it  in  the  power  of  p  »l)lic  men  to  execute,  but  what 
we  ardently  desire  to  see  performed.     When  tlie  feel- 
ing's expand;  when  the  mind  is  elevated  with  a  peru- 
sal of  the  t)fficiai  details  of  a  decisive  vict(»ry,  and  die 
sentiment  of  national  glory  pj^rvades  (he  breast,  we  eu- 
logize the  victor  for  uoihing  bvit  fho,  moment  of  triumph, 


I 

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8 


HISTORICAL  DETAIL*. 


I, 


forg.-tting  tliat  previous  preparations  were  the  precur- 
sors, of  which  the  victory  was  no  more  than  the  result 
So,  when  the  feelings  arc  chilled,  when  the  mind  is; 
depressed  with  the  enunciation  of  a  public  disaster,  anil 
the  sentiment  of  national  degradation  takes  possession 
of  the  bosom,  we  view  the  responsible  officer,  with  pain- 
fill  abhorrence,  as  the  medium  of  disgrace,  without  ta- 
king into  consideration  the  causes,  perhaps  too  stub- 
born for  control,  which  conspired  in  the  production  of 
his  misfortunes.     We  turn  a  deaf  ear  to  his  attempts  at 
justification ;  and,  after  lacerating  his  sensibilities  by 
neglect,  and  wounding  his  honor  by  insult  or  contempt, 
we  force  him  to  appeal  to  posterity  for  justice— and  to 
seek,  in  a  life  of  solitude,  for  that  happiness  which  so- 
ciety unjustly  denies  him. 

In  the  preceding  observations,  it  will  not  be  difficult 
to  discover  a  solicitude  for  the  good  opinion  of  my  coua- 
trymen.  I  do  not  solicit  it  from  their  grace,  I  claim  it 
from  their  impartiality.  The  man  who  has  become  in- 
sensible  to  the  value  of  respect,  has  ceased  to  deserve 
it;  and  he  who  can  receive  the  consideration  of  society 
as  a  favor,  knowing  it  to  be  such,  is  dead  to  every  seia- 
timL'nt  of  honor. 

JAMES  WINCHESTER, 


HISTORICAL  DETAILS.  9 

j\ro.  u. 

«  Heaven  is  just ! 
When  tlie  measure  of  iniquity  is  full, 
Truth  will  bare  its  arm,  aud  launch  itd  lightning.'^ 

Colonel  Wells  was  cjriginally  destined  to  com- 
mand a  detachment  of  troops  for  the  mnforcement  of 
general  Hull,  at  Detroit.     About  this  period  I  was  at 
Lexington,  Kentucky,  superintending  a  r4?cruiting  dis- 
trict, and  occasionally  at  Newport  and  Cincinnati,  foi: 
the  purpose  of  expediting  the  equipment  of  this  de- 
tachment.   Whilst  engaged  in  this  service,  information 
was  receiFed  of  the  fall  of  Detroit,  and  the  capture  of 
general  Hull.    This  change  ia  the  aspect  of  the  war  ou 
5ie  north-western  frontier,  induced  me  to  assume  the 
command  of  the  detachment,  which  at  that  time  had  not 
left  Cincinnati,  and  to  communicate  the  knowledge  of 
my  conduct,  with  the  reasons,  to  the  war  department. 
About  this  period  general  Harrison  arrived,  and  inti- 
mated a  right  to  the  command j  predicated  on  a  commis- 
sion of  major  generulf  then  recently  received  from  th^ 
governor  of  ICentucky.^    Objections  to  the  intended 
procedure  of  general  Harrison  were  made.    They  were 
imavailing.    Two  or  three  notes  passed  between  us ; 
and  when  finally  an  interview  took  place,  it  was  agreed, 
that  general  Harrison  might  assume  the  command,  hut 
on  his  own  responsibility.    I  was  induced  to  concede 
the  point  for  several  reasons.    I  had  myself  assumed 


*  See  Appendix  Q,  captain  Eastland's  letter,  near  the  begin- 


10 


HISTORICAL  DETAILS. 


the  command:'  it  was  not  yet  known  to  the  President — 
nnd  might  not  meet  his  approbation.  In  addition,  I  was 
tieiermined,  that  the  public  service  should  never  suffer 
from  a  personal  contention  with  general  Harrison.  It 
was  of  infinilely  more  moment  that  the  troops  should 
not  be  retarded,  than  that  either  general  Harrison  or 
myself  sliould  command.  For  the  above  considerations 
I  returned  to  Lexington,  Ky.  resuming  the  superinten- 
flency  oi*  the  recruiting  service ;  and  general  Harrison 
marclied  t!ic  detachuieru  in  question  for  Fort  Wayne. 

A  short  time  after  this  period,  I  received  orders  from 
the  secretary  of  war,  forthwith  to  take  command  of  the 
north-western  artoy.  It  is  presumed  that  general  Har- 
riison  had  official  notice  of  this  event ;  for,  ouiay  arrival 
at  Fort  Wayne,  where  the  troops  then  lay,  the  command 
of  them  was  relinquished  by  the  general  with  apparent* 
cordiality,  who  engaged  on  his  return  passing  St.  Ma- 
ry's, to  hasten  on  a  detachment  halted  there,  for  the 
purpose  of  opening  a  road  to  the  site  of  Old  Fort  Defi- 
ance. Hcj  also  engaged  to  forward  Supplies  with  all 
possible  expedition ;  it  being  not  unknown  to  the  gencr 
lal,  that  I  intended  to  march  the  following  day  with 
4ije  army  at  Fort  Wayne  for  Defiance.  It  was  also  not 
unknown  to  general  Harrison,  that  the  utmost  expedi- 
tion  was  essential — t!iat  not  more  than  seven  or  eierht 
days  provisions  could  be  found  in  camp,  and  that  they 
would  be  consumed  on  the  march. f 

My  communication;   under  date  loth   September^ 
1813,  to  brigadier  general  Cushing;  and  one  under 

'  See  Appendix  A,  general  Harrisou**  general  order, 
'•  Sec  4t!>  jmraErraph  Q. 


I 


HISTOBICAL  DETAII.S. 


11 


le  President — 
iddition^  I  was 
Id  never  suffer 
Harrison.  It 
troops  should 
il  Harrison  or 
considerations 
he  superinten- 
leral  Harrison 
ort  Wayne. 

ed  orders  from 
tmmand  of  the 
t  general  Har- 
ouiay  arrival 
,  the  command 
ith  apparent* 
ssing  St.  Ma- 
there,  for  the 
JlUFortDcfi. 
plies  with  all 
n  to  the  gener 
ing  day  with 
;  was  ali^o  noL 
tmost  expedi- 
even  or  eight 
and  that  thcv 

I   September, 
id  one  iintlcj' 

il  order. 


dkte  the  20th  of  the  same  month,  to  general  Hjirrison, 
will  prove  conclusively,  that  I  entertained  no  sentiment^? 
of  hostility  against  him.    It  appears  however  to  have 
been  otherwise  with  the  general ;  for  instead  of  forwar- 
din-  supplies  from  St.  Mary's  to  Defiance,  for  the  sal- 
vatfon  of  a  starving  army,  I  have  it  from  high  authori- 
ty,* that  theS  semval  was  intriguing  with  the  officers  at 
St  Mary's  for  the  purpose  of  rendering  me  unpopular ;. 
and  actually  exhibited  for  the  purpose  a  written  paper, 
which  was  proffered  for  the  signatures  of  the  officers, 
many  of  whom  were  possessed  of  too  stubborn  a  sense. 
of  honor,  to  second  the  general's  views.    I  record  these 
circumstances  thus  particuUrly,  and  in  detail,  because 
they  speak  in  a  voice  of  tiiunder,  on  the  sulyect  of  his 
subsequent  conduct,  not  only  as  respects  myself,  but  the 
disasters  of  the  left  wing  of  the  north-western  army. 

On  the  a3d  of  September,  18t3,  with  the  17th  Uni- 
ted States'  regiment,  commanded  by  colonel  Wells- 
Scott's,  Lewis's,  and  Allen's  regiments  of  Kentucky 
volunteers,  and   captain  Garrard's  troop  of  cavalry, 
amounting  in  all  to  about  two  thousand  two  hundred 
effectives,  I  marched  from  Fort  Wayne,  tor  the  site^of 
Old  Fort  Defiance,  at  the  mouth  of  the  Auglaize.    The 
march  of  this  army  was  conducted  with  tlie  strictest 
caution  and  vigilance.f     Having  a  road  to  open;  and  a 
camp  to  fortify  every  night,  it  was  not  considered  expe- 
dient to  advance  more  than  from  six  to  ten  miles  every 
twenty.four  hours :  hostile  Indians,  in  no  contemptibly 
numbers,  hanging  on  the  rear--assaiiling  the  ihinks^^ 

*  See  Appendix,  C,  F,  L,  Q,  H. 
t  See  Appendix,  B,  E,  G,  J. 


I 


:  \\  I 


'<*«• 


'■m. 


\  ■  * 


y 


-ir'i'«:""yBiiw 


/     / 


i'i 


IS 


HISTORICAL  DETAILS. 


and  frequently  encountering  us  in  front.    On  tbe  25ih, 
enjign  Liggett,  then  with  the  spies,  was  killed  and 
scalped  five  miles  in  advance,  with  four  of  colonel  Al- 
Jen's  regimrnt.     On  the  28lh  the  army  had  advanced 
nearly  to  the  sits  of  Fort  I)efianee=^the  point  at  which 
it  was  intended  to  cross  the  Miami  cf  the  Lakes,  when 
it  was  ascertained  that  the  allies  h&il  concentrated  their 
forces  to  oppose  its  passage— I  ordered  a  retrograde 
movement  of  two  miles,  a^d  crossed  at  a  ford  without 
either  their  o|  p  »sition  or  their  knowledge.     A  council 
of  war  v/as  convened  the  same  evening,  composed  of 
the  general  and  field  officers.     I  proposed  to  move  a 
(Strong  detachment  ta  attack  the  enemy  at  day- break  the 
next  morning.    The  preposition  was  objected  to  by  a 
majority  of  the  officers  present.    The  whole  army  was 
marched  down  the  next  day.    It  was  too  late.     The. 
enemy  had  retreated  precipitately,  after  putting  fire  to 
the  old  huts  at  U»e  mouth  of  the  Auglaize. 

Circumstanced  as  we  were,  pursuit  would  have  been 
vaiu.    Nothing  could  have  been  acliieved.    The  army 
could  have  done  no  more  than  make  a  desperate  exhi- 
?jition  of  valor  in  distress.    In  this  state  of  things,  pru- 
dence dictated  the  e-pediency  of  re-edifying  the  old 
fort  and  store- houses,  and  awaiting  supplies.    A  gene- 
ral order  was  immediately  issued,  from  which  the  fol- 
lowing is  an  extract :  "  A  party,  consisting  of  five  hun- 
dred and  ninety.ninc,  officers  and  men,  shall  be  ^Te- 
tailed,  to  be  employed  in  erecting  block- houses,  a  store- 
house,  an  hospital,  and  in  erecting  a  fort,  &c."    No 
ex-rtions  which  could  be  effective  in  forwardins:  the 
construction  of  these  works  were  wanting.      We'were 
tou  hostile  ground ;  and/  knowing  the  absolute  ueces. 


HISTORICAL  DETAILS. 


18 


sity  of  having  the  works  completed  in  the  shortest  pos- 
sible period,  for  the  reception  and  protection  of  supplies, 
which  were  daily  expected  from  St  Mary's,  the  great- 
est industry  was  disjilayed.  Shortly  after  this,  on  the 
evening  of  the  2d  of  October,  general  Harrison  arrived 
at  Defiance,  possessed  of  a  commission  of  major  gene- 
ral, then  recently  obtained  from  the  war  department. 
He  assumed  the  command,  inspected  the  works  com- 
menced and  progressing  under  my  direction,  obtained 
the  requisite  information,  touching  our  circumstances 
and  supplies,  and  immediately  departed. 

Thus  superceded,  justice  to  my  feelings,  honor  and 
character,  dictated  an  instantaneous  resignation.  But, 
desirous  of  being  serviceable  to  my  country  ;  and,  fore- 
seeing distinctly  the  illiberal  construction  which  would 
be  put  on  my  conduct,  by  those  who  were  not  my 
friends,  in  the  event  of  a  resignation  at  this  period,  I 
resolved  not  to  abandon  the  service,  until  the  army 
could  be  safely  lodged  within  the  ramparts  of  Maiden. 

J.  W. 

Tennessee — Juli/f  I8I7. 


■  7, 


>■" 


i 


jyo.  Ill, 

Ox  the  third  and  fourth  of  October,  general  Tuppe/, 
with  a  detachment  of  mounted  volunteers,  arrived  at 
Defiance.  On  the  fifth,  whilst  the  horses  were  grazing 
on  the  cleared  land,  at  the  point  between  the  Auglaize 
and  Miami  of  the  Lakes,  one  of  thef  i  volunteers  wa« 
shot  and  scalped,  within  three  hundred  yards  of  the 
ground  on  wMch  the  main  body  of  the  detachment  was 


W'M 


yfl)«>.l-^y 


14 


HISTORICAL  DETAILS. 


t      Sj 


■^t 


halted.  The  commission  of  an  act  of  hostility,  within 
so  short  a  distance  of  a  respectable  force,  and  the  intre- 
pidity displayed  by  such  an  exploit,  induced  a  convic- 
tion that  the  numbers  of  the  enemy  were  not  contemp- 
tible; The  whole  of  the  troop»  were  immediately  un- 
der arms,  and  reccmnoitring  [larties  despatched  in  pro- 
per iiii^ctiong.  It  was  reported  in  a  short  time,  that  the 
JBumber  of  the  party  engaged  in  this  affair  did  not  ex^ 
ceed  forty  men ;  but,  this  party  might  be  connected 
with  a  more  formidable  force— rupon  which  the  follow- 
ing general  orders  were  issued  : 

"It  ishesseatXal  that  the  Indians  who  yesterday  per- 
petrated the  murder  near  your  camp  be  pursued  and 
routed ;  or,  their  precise  strength  and  situaHon  ascer- 
tained ;  and,  as  such  duty  can  be  best  and  most  expe- 
ditiously performed  by  mounted  men,  you  will  this 
morning  proceed  wilh  a  part  or  the  whole  of  your  force, , 
to  dislodge,  kill,  a;nd  destroy  them,  if  in  your  pow- 
er. This  duty  performed,  you  can  take  the  course 
prescribed  by  general  Harrison.  The  audacity  of  the 
enemy  requires  this  temporary  change  in  your  destina- 
tion. As  commanding  officer  of  the  left  wing  of  the 
north-western  army,  I  deem  it  an  imperious  duty  to* 
make  it. 

"JAMES  WINCHESTER,. 

"Gen.  Tupper,  &c.  &c.  * 

"'  Qth  October,  1813." 

These  orders  were  not  obeyed.  Information  was  re- 
ceived, that  the  troops  wanted  confidence  in  general' 
Tupper  for  a  service  so  hazardous — that  they  preferred- 
colonel  Allen  of  the  Ktatucky  volunteers  as  a  com- 


HISTORICAL  DETAILS. 


H 


,ion  was  rci 


itander-and,  that  general  Tupper  had  signified  kis 
assent  to  the  indulgence  of  the  troops  in  the  choice  of  a 
leader.    In  conformity  with  the  pressure  of  existing 
circumstances,  and  knowing  that  the  bravest  men  on 
earth,  if  wanting  Taith  in  either  the  ability  or  courage 
of  their  commander,  are  but  instruments  of  disa€ier,  Ue- 
-feat  and  ruin,  I  immediately  issued  an  order  to  colonel 
Allen   who  merited  the  confidence  of  all  who  knew  him, 
to  assume  the  command,  &c.     On  the  promulgation  of 
this  order,  general  Tupper^  who  probably  felt  a  strong 
Dresentiraent  of  the  influence  it  must  have  on  his  mili- 
tary reputation  if  executed,  objected  to  the  assumption 
of  die  command  by  colonel  Allen.    The  necessity  for 
experiment,  in  my  situation,  dictating  the  expediency, 
I  revoked  the  order,  and  restored  general  Tupper  to 
the  command.     Still  he  delayed-and  reported  "  a  de- 
Hciency  of  ammunition^'    This  way  a  singular  report, 
considering  the  practicability  of  obtaining  a  competent 
supply?  previously  to  the  movement  of  his  detachment 
for  Fort  Defiance.    I  have  no  observations  to  make  on 
it,  but  that  general  Harrison  must  have  known  the  con- 
dition of  theleft  wing  of  the  north-western  army,  touch- 
ing supplies  of  every  description. 

To  obviate  this  new  obstacle  to  the  service  of  gene- 
ral Tupper's  troops,  the  quarter- master  was  directed  to 
report  the  quantity  of  ammiuiition  on  hand.  The  re- 
port evinced  that  none  could  be  spared—but,  a  know- 
ledge of  this  circumstance  vould  have  added  nothing  to 
the  spirits  or  confidence  of  the  army.  Under  pretence 
of  preventing  the  soldiery  from  wasting  them  unneces- 
sarily, cartridges  were  dr  iwn  from  the  boxes  of  all  the 
corps  not  intended  for  immediate  gcrvice,  for  the  supply 


i 


'5^m^ 


■■mmmmmm'mmm''' 


16 


HISTORICAL  DETAILS. 


of  genera]  Tupper's  men.  They  were  supplied — but, 
the  general  did  »ot  proceed  io  execute  the  duties  as- 
signed him.  The  delay  produced  the  following  order: — 

"  Cafnp,  Defiance,  Oct.  7,  1813. 
"Brigadier  General  Tupper — Delay^  inconsis' 
tent  with  military  operations,  cannot  longer  be  indul- 
ged.  You  will  therefore  immediately  proceed  on  the 
duty  ordered  yesterday  morning,  with  the  trcops  under 
your  command,  exclusively  of  colonel  SimralPs  corps, 
which  shall  return  without  delay  to  the  settlements,  for 
the  purpose  of  recruiting  their  horses,  agreeably  to  the 
orders  of  general  Harrison. 

«  J.  WINCHEiSTER,  Brig.  Gen^ 
*•  U.  S.  drmy.'' 

Soon  after  the  promulgation  of  this  order,  which  was 
disregarded,  general  Tupper  broke  up  his  camp  in  a 
tumultuous  manner,  and  took  the  direction  to  the  inte- 
rior of  Ohio.  I  demanded  of  general  Harrison  his  ar- 
rest, on  charges  exhibited.  The  arrest  took  place — and 
it  was  distinctly  understood,  that  general  Tupper  should 
be  tried,  when  a  junction  of  the  troops  composing  the 
north-western  array  should  be  effected  at  the  Rapids  of 
the  Miami,  which  was  expected  in  the  lapse  of  a  very 
short  period. 

General  Tupper  was  afterwards  tried ;  but,  under 
circumstances  wliich  precluded*  any  enforcement  of  the 
charges  against  him.  I  was  a  prisoner — in  addition  to 
this  an  inference  may  be  drawn,  as  "to  the  peculiar  cha- 
racter of  his  trial,  by  comparing  his  iinmiliiary  conduct 
witli  general  Harrison^ s  order,  publishing  the  sentence 

*  I  was  uot  even  notified  of  the  time  of  trial. 


-__   ^^ 


-  ( 


^    "*'^'SgtfflMWB^S[Xwi 


-  -  "safes. 


HlSTOHICxVL  DETAILS. 


i7 


of  the  court ;  and  the  followin*  extract  from  general 
Harrison's  letter  on  the  sulyect  of  hU  arrest,  which  was 
forwarded  to  general  Armstrong,  when  at  the  helm  of 
tile  war  department : 

"General  Winchester  has  exhibited  charges  against 
i;eneral  Tapper,  and  has  requested  me  to  appoint  i 
court  of  enquiry  for  himself.  It  is  to  be  regretted  that 
he  should  think  either  necessary.  I  had,  however,  or- 
dered general  Tupper  in  arrest,  before  I  knew  of  his 
ileparture  for  the  Rapids,  and  he  did  not  receive  it  un- 
til his  return.  It  will  not  be  possible  to  have  either  the 
court  of  enquiry  or  court  martial  until  the  army  itn/^es* 
at  the  llapids^ 

1  am  not  prepared  to  aver,  that  major  general  Har- 
rison could  have  felt  so  much  partiality  for  general 
Tupper  as  to  wish  for  his  acquittal  under  improper  cir- 
cumstances.— I  am  persuaded,  that  had  he  been  made 
ac([uainted  with  the  event  attending  general  Topper's 
retreat  from  the  llapids,  before  the  co-operating  forca 
sent  by  me  could  reach  that  point,  no  such  partiafiity 
would  have  been  entertained  for  him  as  a  military  man. 

Query  1st.  Did  general  Tupper  march  for  fort  Defi- 
ance by  order  of  general  Harrison  ? 

2(1.  Why  did  he  arrive,  without  ammunition? 

3d.  Was  not  general  Harrison  perfectly  aware  of  the 
couditiou  and  circumstaaceg  of  the  left  wing  of  the  norths 
western  army  ? 


*  Will  the  general  now  say,  that  a  junction  of  the  winga  and 
centre  of  the  north-we.stera  army,  was  not  to  be  efifected  at  the. 
ttapida.? 

C 


J 


\l 


fi:!f?fe^p*i 


■"%j^" 


ib 


HISTORICAL  DETAILS. 


H 


I 


•illi.  Compared  with  the  centre  and  right  win-g,  what 
was  the  state  of  supplies,  durirrg  tire  whole  eaiopaigft?* 

dlh.  Why  t\\i\  the  iti)o\i9  under  the  command  of  gc 
iieral  Tupper,  after  reaching  Defiance,  refuse  to  con* 
tihoe  pubscrvieiH  to  that  command,  wlieu  ordered  ow 
duty? 

0th.  Can  it  be  possible  that  general  Tupper  was  in- 
istrumental  to  their  tlefection?  ami,  if  so,  for  what  reason? 

7th.  Could  this  detachntent  have  ohjeeted  to  actual 
service,  under  a  commander  who  marched  them  out — 
unless  from  a  pre- determination  ta  resist  or  disregard 
m^'  orders? 

8lh.  When  the  first  objection  to  their  movement  was 
dbvtatcd,  by  the  appointment  of  colonel  Allen  to  the 
Ajommand,  why  did  they  not  march  ? 

9th.  After  the  report  (»f  general  Tupper,  as  to  "  de- 
ficiency of  ammunition,"  ind  after  this  second  obstacle 
had  been  surmounted,  as  previously  mentioned,  why 
did  he  dtluy  ?  .  . 

10th.  Or  did  general  Tupper  and  his  detachment  die- 
tCi'tnine,  that  rather  than  obey  any  superior  officer  who, 
was  not  general  Harrison,  they  would  hazard  all  con,- 
sequences  which  might  arise  from  a  disobedience  of  or- 
ders— whether  relating  to  their  own  safety,  or  that  ot 
their  country  ?  Forbid  it  justice !  forbid  it  heaven  ! 

J.  W. 

'J'ennessee — July,  1817. 


*  See  4ij){>f ndix,  B,  E,  Matliaon  and  Gtiiy). 


'-Jt 


ht  wing,  what 
seaiopaigft?* 
nmaud  of  gc 
efiise  to  con* 
a  ordered  ou 

ipper  was  in- 
what  reason? 
^ted  to  actual 
d  them  out — 
or  disregard 

lovement  was 
Allen  to  the 


rj  as  to  "  de- 
cond  obstacle 
liioncd,  why 

ttachment  de- 
n'  officer  who, 
zard  all  coiv 
idience  of  or- 
y,  or  that  ot 
t  heaven ! 
J.  W. 


I 


HISTORICAL  DETAILS. 
JVo.  IT. 


in 


In  the  interim,  the  fortifications  at  Behaiico  were  ra- 
pidly  advancing  to  completion.    The  activity  and  in- 
dustry of  the  troops  in  working  on     m  w«ro  redout), 
led,  by  anxiety  to  encounter  tlie  enemy  while  the  wea- 
ther  should  be  mild,  and  the  several  corps  undiminish- 
ed by  the  common  diseases  of  a  camp.    On  the  18th  of 
October,  the  forti?oations,  the  store-house  and  hospital 
Were  finished.    The  troops  were  then  immediately  em- 
ployed, in  constructing  boats,  for  the  transportation  of 
the  supplies  and  baggage  of  the  army  to  t^e  Rapids  of 
the  Miami.    On  the  20th  of  October,  an  ordier  was  ad- 
dressed  to  quarter- master  Bodley,  from  which  the  fol- 
lowing is  an  extract:— "Urge  all  possible  raeaiW  to 
hasten  on  supplies  to  this  place.    The  fort  is  cohiple- 
ted,  and  there  is  store  room  sufficient.     Boats  are  al- 
ready prepared  for  the  transportation  of  two  hundred 
barrels  of  flour— the  river  is  rising— and  the  spirits  of 
the  army  high.    It  is  all  important  to  move  with  art  am- 
ple supply  of  provisions— therefore,  I  repeat  the  neces- 
sity of  your  redoubled  exertions.  Force  into  service  all 
means  o*  transportation  in  your  power.  1  have  ordered 
the  road  to  be  repaired — and  hope  no  longer  to  be  re- 
tarded, in  the  prosecution  of  the  objects  of  the  campaign 
for  the  want  of  supplies.*'     On  the  33d  of  the  same 
month,  another  order  was  addressed  to  quartermaster 
Bodley,  from  which  the  following  is  a  quotation  :  "  The 
army  is  about  to  advance.   Great  industry  must  be  used 
to  furnish  the  advanced  troops  with  adequact  supplies. 
Salt  can  be  packed  in  abundance,  and  a  few  thousand 
of  hogs  can  be  driven  in,  slaughtered^  and  saved  I'.tthe 
posts  at  which  the  rations  will  be  required. — Beef  frort\ 


^/ 


iu 


HISTORICAL  DETAILS. 

the  lioof  will  Booii  be  too  lean  to  depend  on— and  it 
will  be  exiremi'ly  exiient»ivo  to  trans|)UFt  it  in  barrels. 
Without  delay,  then,  send  ofl*  a  large  tirove  of  bogs  to 
ibe  UapHtS;  with  salt  *<Mfflcient  to  preserve  them.'' 

The  troops  were  employed,  in  augmenting  the  means 
of  transportation — repairing  the  roads  in  the  rear — and 
opening  a  road  in  front.  As  tlie  season  advanced,  their 
impatience  to  press  forward  for  the  liapids  became  al- 
most ungovernable.  It  was  not  to  be  wondered  at.  In 
addition  to  (he  desire  of  signalizing  themselves  by  some, 
brilliant  achie  -ement,  they  wanted  the  necessaries  of 
life.  There  was  a  large  quantity  of  corn  at  the  Uapids;, 
of  which  they  stood  much  in  need  ;  in  truth  the  horses 
were  so  weak  as  to  be  almost  incapalde  of  moving  the 
empty  baggage  wagons.  I  endeavored  to  impress  on  the 
minds  of  (he  secretary  of  war,  and  the  commanding  gen- 
eral; the  policy  of  advancing  the  army  whilst  the  spirits 
of  the  troops  were  unbroken — before  the  rigors  of  a  nor- 
thern winter  could  close  the  navigation  of  the  Miami 
against  the  descent  of  our  uRgg.igo  and  supplies — and, 
before  we  should  be  left  to  the  horrors  of  etarvation  and 
the  sufferings  of  nakedness,  in  tiie  deplh  of  a  winter  of 
the  r;)r*j, -second  degree  of  north  latitude.  It  will  be  re- 
rf-^'rHtt!,  thr*  hiost  of  the  troops  composing  the  left 
wing  were  from  what  may  be  denominated  southern 
states.  If  (he  Miami  should  be  »zeu  over,  I  could 
jiave  but  one  alternative,  for  tlie  tra  .sportation  of  bag- 
gage and  supplies,  independently  of  a  few  poor,  worn- 
down  horses,  which  was,  to  cause  them  to  be  drawn  by 
the  troops,  through  the  snows  of  such  a  climate,  with- 
out  either  shoes,  st<»cking8,  coiits  or  blankets-r-in  fact, 
by  troops  nunv  cf  whom  were  nearly  in  a  state  of  m- 


"^^'""'■^^ 


inSTOHTCAL  DEtAlLS. 


VI 


1  on— and  it 
it  in  Imrrels. 
ve  «f  liogs  to 
J  tiieni.'^ 
ngtlie  means 
lie  rear — and 
vanced,  their 
s  became  al- 
tered at.  Ill 
slveshy  eomo 
ecessaries  of 
I  the  Uapids^ 
III  tbe  liorses 
r  moving  llio 
n press  on  the 
Handing  gen- 
Ist  the  spirits 
;ors  of  a  nor- 
f  the  Miami 
pplies — and, 
larvatjon  and 
•fa  winter  of 
It  will  be  re- 
sing  the  left 
led  southern 
►ver,  I  could. 
Uion  of  bag- 
poor,  worn- 
be  drawn  by 
imate,  with- 
?ts-!— in  fact, 
state  of  uu. 


dily .  1  endeavored  to  impress  on  the  minds  of  thf  sec 
itary  of  war,  and  the  commanding  general,  thut  it 
ould  be  policy,  humanity,  to  descend  to  the  Rapids 


re 
w 


of 


before' the  iJiseanes  incicleijtal  to  this  country  oi  swamps 
and  lakes,  shouW  thin  the  ranks  of  th's  gallao'  army, 
and  reduce  it  to  a  shadow  !  Yet  we  were  permitted  to 
Rgonize  in  this  state  of  suspense,  frerjuenily  without 
provi8io!»s,  until  the  80th  of  Decomber. 

On  the  SSth  of  December,  I  received  orders  from 
general  Harrison,  to  march  for  the  Uupids  as  soon  as 
ten  days  provisions  could  be  jfrovided  ;  and  also  icas 
advised  by  him,  that  a  co  operating  force  from  the  cen- 
tre ^  with  ample  supplies,  might  be  expected  at  that 
point,   lly  the  30lh,  rations  were  procured,  and  the  ar- 
my marched.     At  this  time  the  river,  the  Miami  of  the 
Lakes,  was  choked  by  immense  quantities  of  ice.    Sta. 
nuous  cflforts  were  made  by  the  troops  to  hew  a  passage 
for  the  boats  through  these  frozen  masses.     The  ut- 
most exertion  was  baflled,  and  after  two  days  incessant 
laboi,  the  hope  of  effecting  it  was  abandoned.    But  one 
alternative  seemed  to  remain.   I  had  a  few  impoverished 
horses ;  but  the  unconquerable  souls  of  these  gallant 
men,  almost  precluded  the  use  of  them. — T'hose  heroes 
who  could  bow  to  the  pressure  of  no  misfortune — whom 
neither  disasters  could  depress,  ncr  dangers   intimi- 
ilate — harnassed   themselves  to  sleds,  and  advanced 
Vi\i\\  the  sickj  the  stores  and  baggage,  through  snow  two 
feet  deep,  destitute  as  they  were  of  clothing,  bridgin 
the  wate<  courses,  which  were  not  frozen  in  the  centre, 
and  arrived  at  the  Kapids  of  the  Miami  oij  the  lOlh  of 
January,  1818k 


'M 


f  \ 


■  m0i^%  ./. 


^ 


HISTORICAI4  DETAILS. 


/; 


f'' 


\ 


Wjien  we  reached  tbi?  poini,  there  were  visible  in- 
clic«,tio»9  of  the  recent  decampiuent  of  Indians.  The 
army  now  consisted  of  about  ekmn  hundred  ^ective 
men,  exclusive  of  the  garrisons  in  the  rear ;  and,  al- 
tlKHJgh  emaciated  with  excessive  fatigue-->enduring  the 
privation  of  hunger,  and  exposed  to  intense  cold,  the 
spirit  of  these  troops  for  military  enterprise  was  un< 
subdued. 

When  the  fortifications  and  other  buildings  at  Old 
Fort  Defiance  were  finished,  about  the  19th  of  October, 
this  aruay  consisted  of  about  eighteen  hmidred  effective 
men. — 1  then  urged  to  the  proper  autho.ities,  and  to 
the  commander  in  chief  in  particular,  the  absolute  ne- 
cessity of  advancing  to  the  Rapids.  The  |>ropo»ition 
was  opposed,  on  a  plea  of  the  impossibility  of  supply- 
ing such  an  army  in  advance  ! — ^It  sometimes  happens, 
that  an  avowed  pretext  is  substituted  fur  a  concealed 
reason.  At  that  time,  any  quantity  of  provisions,  and 
every  requisite  for  the  supply  of  double  the  number  of 
men,  could  have  been  transported  with  ease  and  safety 
to  the  Rapids.  The  Miami  of  Ihe  Lakes  is  generally 
navigable  unless  in  winter,  for  boats  of  considerable 
burthen. — There  could  have  been  very  little  diiference 
between  supplying  the  troops  at  Fort  Winchester*  or 
at  the  Rdpids,  cour  Mleriug  the  facility  of  water  trans- 
portation.  Supplies  deposited  at  Fort  AVinchesler 
could  have  been  protected  by  the  troops  advancing. 
The  van  of  the  army  could  have  covered  itself  with 
stronsi  works  at  the  Rapidsr-^conslrHcted  barracks, 
storii-liouses,  &c. — secured  the  corn  and  fodder,  of 
which  there  were  at  that  time  largu  qi,antitics — kept 

*  Situated  near  the  ruin?  of  Defiance. 


visible  in- 
ians.  Tiie 
ed  ^ective 
c;  and,  al- 
nduring  tlic 
e  cold,  the 
se  was  un< 

ings  at  Old 
of  October, 
ed  effective 
ies,  and  to 
bsolutc  ue- 
[H'opo^ition 

of  supply-. 
}s  happens, 
,  concealed 
isious,  and 
(  number  of 

and  safety 
s  generally 
}nsiderable 
B  dliferenee 
Chester*  or 
^ater  trans- 
Winchester 
advancing. 

itself  with 
I   barracks, 

fodder,  of 
itics — kept 


HISTORICAL  DETAILS. 

itiaraading  parties  of  Indians  in  check—and  been  in 
comfortable  quarters.  Not  so !  when  instead  of  eightten 
hundred  effective  men,  the  van  consisted  of  bnt  eleven 
hundred— men  in  a  state  of  starvation,  borne  down  by 
exposure  to  tlie  rigors  of  a  severe  climate,  enduring 
every  privation  and  worn  out  with  fatigue. 

J.    tT  • 

Tennessee — Juhj^  1817. 


J\*0.  V, 

On  the  morning  of  the  march  of  the  army  from  Ik- 
I  fiance,  advices  of  the  movement  were  despatched  to  ge- 
neral Harrison,  in  conformity  with  the  instructions  con- 
tained in  his  order  to  march  for  the  Rapids,  of  the  25tU 
of  December;  and  to  enable  him,  agreeably  to  hi«  as- 
surances, to  meet  me  at  the  Rapids,  with  a  co  operating 
force  and  su|>|>Vies  under  general  Tupper,  from  the  cen- 
tre and  right  wing.  At  the  same  tir^.e,  and  by  the  same 
express,*  Mr.  Leslie  Combs,  T  communicated  to  gene- 
ral Tupper  similar  information. 

Whilst  on  the  march  from  the  encampment  near  I>c- 
iiance,  about  the  third  day,  I  received  another  commu-. 
uication  from  general  Harrison,  comprising  an  order  to 
abandon  the  idea  of  advancing  to  the  Rapids,  unlese  ths 
amvi  had  already  moved.  Having  been  three  days  on 
the  march,  and  under  such  circumstances  as  arc  noted 
in  the  preceding  number,  I  considered  this  order  inope- 
rative and  nugatory.   Such  might  have  been  tlie  %te  for 

*  See  AppendU,  K. 


h 


Vi 
si 


S4 


HISTORICAL  DETxVlLS. 


which  it  was  in teiulcd .-^Apparent  disregard  of  such  an 
order,  in  tlie  event  of  a  disastrous  destiny,  would  divest 
the  commander  in  chief  of  all  responsibility.  Tlie  array 
continued  its  march,  and  arrived  at  the  Rapids,  as  be- 
fore stated,  on  the  lOth  of  January,  1813. 

After  reconnoitring  the  vicinity  of  the  place  with  a 
strong  detachment,  a  position  was  selected  for  aa  en- 
campment, on  the  left  bank  of  the  Miami,  near  the  bat- 
tle ground  of  general  Wayne.     It  was  a  commanding 
eminence  of  an  oblong  form — clear  from  under  wood — 
covered  with  heavy  timber — and  surrounded  by  low 
prairies  and  the  river.     This  position  was  fortified  se- 
curely with  trunks  of  trees ;  large  store-houses  were 
built,  and  a  quantity  of  corn  gatliercd  from  the  fields, 
which  was  considered  a  luxury— so  long  had  these 
brave  men  been  on  short,  and  sometimes  no  alh»wance. 
The  unbroken  snow  surrounding  the  camp,  reminded 
us  every  hour  of  the  absence  of  the  expected  co  opera- 
ting force  and  supplies !  The  circumstances  we  were 
in  were  depressing ;  but  hope  reconciled  us  to  disap- 
pointment for  some  days.     In  the  interim,  many  aii 
anxious  look  was  directed  toward  theriglit  bank  of  the 
river,  in  search  of  the  van  of  general  Tupper'3  brigade. 
In  vain !  General  Tapper's  brigade  with  supplies  nev- 
er arrived ! 

On  the  nth,  the  day  after  reaching  the  Rapids,  I 
despatched  anotlicr  communication  by  a  soldier  to  gene- 
ral Harrison,  advising  him  of  my  arrival— also  stating, 
that  the  impoverislied  pack-horses  were  sent  back  to 
be  recruited  by  way  of  Fort  M-Arthnr,  in  order  that 
the  road  might  be  broken,  and  tlie  advance  of  troops 
with  supplies  from  thence  facilitated,    Oa  the  mix  ^ 


I 


HISTORICAL  DETAILS. 


^ 


1  of  such  an 

oiild  (Uvcst 

Tlie  array 

(ids,  as  be- 

ace  with  a 
for  aa  en- 
ear  the  bat- 
jmrnandiiig 
ler  wood — 
led  by  low 
fortified  se- 
louses  were 
I  the  fields, 
;  had  tliese 

I  alh»wance. 
U  reminded 
id  CO  opera- 
B9  wc  were 
us  to  disap- 
1,  many  an 

bank  of  tho 
;r'3  brigade, 
upplies  nev- 

e  Rapids,  I 
dier  to^ene- 
'alsostating, 
icnt  back  to 

II  order  that 
cc  of  troopai 
[1  tlic  mil  ]^ 


also  wrote  to  general  Tupper,  nptifying  him  of  mypo. 
eition  and  circnmst^nces,  ^nd  expressing  a  hope,  that 
lifter  having  received  my  letter  pf  the  ^9th  ultimo,  he 
had  immediately  marched  with  supplies  &c.  At  this 
period  ;I  was  unadvised  whether  genBral  Harrison's 
headquarters  were  at  Upper  or  Lower  Sandusky, 
9r  JBLi  JPrankliuton.  Mature  consideration,  therefore, 
dicUted  t^  expediency  pf  transmitting  despatches 
to  h^m  by  way  of  Fort  Ml* Arthur.  A  communicatioa 
vqjild  havfi  been  ^nade  to  general  Harrison,  touching 
the  contUiiuatiQU  of  the  advanpe  of  the  array,  on  t'he 
inarch  between  Defiance  and  the  Rapids,  had  it  been 
posai^e ;  but  there  was  not  a  horse  in  camp,  competent 
to  tl?e  performance  of  the  journey,  and  fojtmen  must 
inevitably  have  p^ri&hed  in  an  attempt  to  reach  either 
of  the  Sanduskies,  or.Franklinton,  tlirough  such  a  snow 
as  was  then  upon  the  ground. 

Late  in  the  night  of  the  Igth  of  January,  a  citizen 
from  Frenchtown,  which  is  site  "ted  on  both  banks  of 
the  river  Au  Raisin,  but  principally  upon  the  left,  ar- 
riveil  in  camp,  with  information  that  the  alUes  were  as- 
sembling their  forces  at  that  point,  and  were  employed 
in  plundering  and  mal-treating  the  inhabitants.  On  the 
succeeding  night,  the  13th  of  January,  two  men  fron^ 
the  same  place  came  in,  and  confirmed  the  intelligence 
received  the  night  preceding— and  added,  that  the  In- 
dians had  threatened  to  murder  the  inhabitants  and  burn 
the  town.  For  these  defenceless  people,  and  in  their 
names,  they  sued  for  protection  from  the  arms  of  the 
United  States.  On  the  l^jth  of  January  another  mes- 
sender  arrived;  with  a  despatch  from  the  inhabitants 

°  IT 


i\ 


PIfiwpw 


IM 


i:,^i'Wm-u.—'i^-' 


iggmmm:- 


S6 


HISTORICAL  DETAILS, 


M 


who  were  friendly  to  the  American  cause.    This  com- 
munication stated  explicKly^  that  the  British  were  ar- 
resting all  persons  who  were  suspecletl  of  being  inimi- 
cal to  their  arms,  and  sending  them  into  confinement  in 
Canada — that  they  were  preparing  to  seize  all  the  pro. 
visions  and  stock  of  the  inhabitants — am!  that  their 
avowed  intention  was,  to  attack  the  American  camp  at 
the  Rapids,  the  moment  their  forces,  which  were  assem- 
bling, idiould  be  deemed  sufficiently  strong.     On  the 
15th  of  January  I  wrote  to  general  Perkins,  then  at 
Lower  Sandusky,  a  distance  of  little  more  than  thirty 
miles,  advising  him  of  my  arrival — and  stating,  that  in- 
telligence recently  received  from  Frenchtown,  strongly 
pointed  to  the  necessity  of  an  advance  to  that  place  with 
as  little  delay  as  possible — ^that  to  enable  me  to  go  on, 
and  leave  the  camp  at  the  Rapids  secure,  a  co-opera- 
ling  force  of  a  battalion  of  infantry  would  be  necessary, 
and,  if  it  ceuld  be  spared,  I  wished  a  troop  of  horfie. 
My  design  in  addressing  general  Perkins,  rather  than 
tlic  commander  in  chief,  at  this  time,  was,  that  general 
Perkins  might  be  enabled  to  comply  with  the  re- 
quisitions made  in  that  letter,  should  the  absence  of 
ajcner.al  Harrison  preclude  the  possibility  of  his  seeing 
it  in  time.     Had  the  communication  been  addressed  to 
:;(!ncral  Harrison,  and  he  not  at  Lower  Sandusky,  ge- 
tKMal  Perkins  must  have  remained  ignorant  of  its  con- 
i(.ivt3 — and  in  the  event  of  the  head-quarters  of  the  com- 
aiaiider  in  chief  being  at  Lower  Sandusky,  general 
Pciklns  would  of  course  exhibit  the  letter. 

On  the  I6tli  of  January  two  additional  messengers 
rime  in  from  Fri'nchtown,  and  authenticated  the  intel- 
ii^onr(«  previously  received.    These  messengers  stated, 


■i.rt«i^ 


HISTORICAL  DETAILS. 


S7 


1)18  00111- 

were  ar- 
ig  inimi- 
lement  in 
I  the  pro. 
Iiat  their 

camp  at 
'e  assem- 
On  the 
f  then  at 
lan  thirty 
;y  that  itt. 

strongly 
lace  with 
lo  go  on, 
co-opera- 
ecessary, 
of  horse, 
idler  than 
it  general 
I  the  re- 
hseuce  of 
lis  seeing 
Iressed  to 
usky,  ge. 
►f  its  con- 
f  the  com- 
r,  general 

lessengers 
the  iotel- 

PI'S  stated^ 


illiat  the  force  of  the  enemy  was  about  500  strong,  and 
hourly  receiving  accessions;  that  if  that  force  weiG 
not  immediately  defeated  and  dispersed,  an  attack  on 
the  American  troops  at  the  Rapids  would  very  shortly 
be  the  result— and  that  ia  the  event  of  an  advance  of 
the  American  forces,  previously  to  the  commission  of 
the  robbery  meditated  by  the  allied  army  under  colonel 
Frocter,  the  inhabitants  could  and  would  supply  us 
with  provisions.* 

Under  Ihese  circumstances,  three  propositions  wero^^ 
propounded  to  a  council  of  war. 

Ist.  We  must  either  stay  where  we  are,  and  await 
an  attack — which  will  certainly  not  lie  made,  until  an 
augmentation  of  the  enemy's  foroj  shall  ensure  his  suc- 
cess ; 

gd.  Or  retreat  ignominiously,  abandoning  the  de- 
fenceless inhabitants  of  Frenchtown  to  British  magna' 
mmity  and  Indian  compassion  ; 
3d.  Or  advance. 

The  last  proposition  was  unanimously  sanctioned,! 
as  well  on  military  principles,  as  on  those  of  humanity 
and  political  justice.  And  not  to  digress,  the  arms  of 
the  United  States  are  as  irrevocably  bound  to  protect « 
single  individual,  as  a  million.  The  social  compact  be^ 
comes  a  rope  of  sand,  is  rent  asunder,^  the  instant  a. 

*  See  Appendix,  B  and  J — Madison's  and  Lewis's  affidavits. 

t  See  Appendix,  B  and  J,  again. 

\  Lest  this  proposition  he  cavilled  at— the  individual  who  vr- 
olates  either  the  civil,  military  or  criminal  code  of  our  country, 
tacitly  assents  to  the  application  of  the  penalty  or  sanction  an 
'^ipxed  to  a  breach  of  the  laM  s. 


fj 


^.>  ^^gt^m&_  ,^^ 


•,.-W8l*£- 


HISTORICAL  DETAILS. 

single  individual  is  sacrificed  ^^ilKout  his  assent^  even 
for  the  salvation  of  the  republic.  ;^ut,  were  every 
ground  of  thus  deciding  on  principled  connfected'  wiHt' 
Humanity  and  political  justice  abandoned,  it  wiH  never 
be  doubted  by  military  men,  that  it  is  imperiously  the 
duty  of  every  responsible  offlder,  to  prevent  if  possible 
ihe  augmentation  and  cohcentrati  n  of  the  foi'ces  of  an 
antagonist.  For  these  reasons,  and  under  the  circum- 
stances previously  detailed,  an  advance  to  Fr^nchtowtt 
\vas   determined  on,  and   arrangements  immediately 

made  to  ffive  efficiency  to  the  mea»ure. 

J.  W, 

Tennessee-— July f  IS17. 


B'  .1  S 


jsro.  VL 

In  conformity  with  my  determination  to  dislodge 
the  enemy,  and  protect  Frenchtcwn,  and  for  the  reasons 
stated  in  the  preceding  number,  on  the  morning  of  the 
17th  of  January,  after  addressing  a  despatch  to  gene- 
ral Harrison  J  which  was  transmitted  by  esepvess,  J.  or- 
dered colonel  Lewis,  with  four  hundred  and  fifty  men, 
to  the  river  Au  Raisin,  immediately  subsequent  to  tho 
movement  of  this  detachment,  appr6he^ing  that,  in 
additon  to  the  alli(d  forces  then  at  Frenchtown,  the 
troops  under  colonel  Lewis  might  have  to  contend  with 
a  reinforcement  for  the  enemy  from  Maiden,  I  ordered 
lieutenant  colonel  Allen,  with  one  hundred  men,  as  ex- 
peditiously as  possible,  to  reinforce  colonel  Lewis^ — 


(:/ 


■  '<^\miiifgr~i\umm, 


HISTORICAL  DETAILS. 


S9 


wWch  #aa  efffected  the  sartie  evehing  ti  PrM^oelale.* 
Durrni^  tire  encimptaftnt  of  colotiel  Lewis  ttHhU  place, 
the  night  of  the  17th,  he  r^ceivedi  an  inthtfation  of  the 
advance  6f«^  British  reinfrtfcement  mider  doloiMil  Elliott 
from  Maiden,  destined  fbt  tfce  support  of  tlite  allied  at 
Frenchtbv^n.  Tkh  advice  was  immediately  eommuni-* 
cated  to  me ;  and  colonel  Lewis,  as  was  Imperioasly 
Ms  duty,  precipitated  the  moteiiienton  Frenchtown>  for 
the  pur[>o8e,  if  possible,  of  preventifis*  the  rtpptehendcd 
consolidation  of  the  enemy's  forces  at  that  point— and 
of  beating  them  in  detail. 

Colonel  Lewis,  lieutenant  colonel  Allen,  the  oflficers 
who  acted  umter  them,  and  the  troops  engaged  in  the 
conflict  of  the  iSth,  deserve  the  highest  consideration ; 
and,  as  appertaining  to  justice,  perhaps  a  concise  and 
authentic  detifil  of  tire  events  attending  the  dislodgement 
of  the  enemy  from  F^enchtown  on  that  day,  may  not  be 
uniilteresting  —At  S  o'clock  P.  M.  of  the  18th,  colonel 
Lewis  made  his  appearance  on  tlie  south  side  of  the 
town — his  left  commanded  by  major  Graves — his  right 
by  lieutenant  colonel  Allen,  and  his  centre,  comprising 
a  part  of  the  17th  U.  S.  regiment,  under  major  George 
Madison.  Captain  Ballard,  acting  as  major,  was  or- 
dered in  advatice,  with  two  companies  under  captains 
Hickman  and  Chinn,  to  bring  on  the  engagement, 
i^renchtown  being  situated  on  both  banks  of  the  Au 
Jlaisii,  and  the  enemy  posted  in  line  on  the  north  side, 
whilst  the  Anierican  troops  were  a<Ivancing,  they  were 
opened  upon  with  a  howitzer,  from  which  little  or  no 


.  *  The  Historical  Register  of  ofiieial  dbcumcnts,  in  colonel 
Lewis's  official  report,  make^  a  mis-statement  as  to  the  day  oq 
^hich  Allen  reinforced  Lewis. 


lA' 


•»'■ 


#4.^..' 


JD 


IHSTOttlCAL  DERAILS; 


injury  was  sustained.   On  reacliing  the  »outIi  bank,  and 
receiving  a  heavy  fire,  which  was  returned  with  des- 
tructive effect — the  river  being  strongly  frozen,  and. 
only  from  eighty  to  one  hundred  yards  in  width,  a 
charge  wa*  ordered,  'and  lieutenant  colonel  Allen. di«, 
rected,  wUhoot  fail  to  possess  himself  of  the  enemy's 
artillery.    A  charge  was  made  across  the  river,  and  for 
some  minutes  contested  by  the  enemy,  with  an  obsti- 
nacy whicli  would  have  done^  honor  to  a  better  cause. 
They  were,  however,  driven  from  th«ir  position,  and. 
retreated  northwardly  from  the  town,  taking  with  them . 
their  artillery,  notwithstanding  the  desperate  attempts 
of  lieutenant  colonel  Allen  to  make  himself  master  of  it,. 
At  Ibis  time,  they  were  evidently  aiming  to  possess 
themselves  of  some  woodland,  which  lay  in  the  direc-. 
tion  of  their  retreat.    Colonel  Lewis,  no  d<^iibt  instantly 
apprehending  the  object,  ordered  the  charge  to  be  re- 
newed^ for  the  purpose  of  prevetiting  the  enemy  from, 
gaining  possession  of  a  cover,  from  which  his  troops 
could  Ilie  annoyed  with  impunity  ;  and  possessed  him- 
self of  the  edge  of  the  wood  in  a  few  minutes  after  them. 
Here  the  confliot  continued  until  night,  under  cover  of 
which,  the  enemy  made  a  final  retreat  in  the  direction 
of  Brownstown,  it  is  presumed  with  v^ry  considerable, 
loss. 

I -On  the  moi'ning  of  tiie  19th,  I  received' from  colonel 
Lewis  official  advice  of  the  dislodgemcnt  of  the  British 
and  Indians,  and  their  consequent  i«treat.  This  infor- 
mation was  immediately  sent  by  express  to  general 
Harrison.  The  apprehended  reinforctiment  from  Mai- 
dtn,  umler  colonel  Elliott,  was  not  at  the  Au  Raisin 
on  thp  18tb,  I  was  not,  hov/cver,,  without  anticipations^ 


HISTORICAL  DETAILS. 


«i 


that  the  allies,  on  their  retreat  toward  Brownetown, 
might  be  met  by  colonel  Elliott  with  a  reinforcement.  la 
this  eveat  a<;oinbination  of  the  forcos  advancing  and  rew 
treating;  mtghtprobably  induce  the  enemy  to  attempt  re- 
gaining their  former  position — and  to  redeem  tlie  dis. 
grace  of  a  defeat.  I  therefore  ordered  colonel  Wells,  witli 
260  men^  all  the  disposable  force  which  could  with  safety 
be  spared  from  the  Rapids,  to  advance  to  Frenchtown, 
for  the  support  of  colonel  Lewie.  I  attended  it  some 
xlistance ;  but,  knowing  the  absolute  necessity  of  being 
at  the  point  of  advance,  in  as  short  a  time  as  possible^ 
I  proceeded  th€  same  day  and  night,  accovupanied  by 
my  aids-de-camp  and  a  small  guard,  leaving  the  de- 
tachment to  follow,  and  arrived  in  camp,  at  the  An  Rai- 
sin, very  carj)^  in  the  morning  of  the  20lh,  and  assumed 
the  commanu.  I  found  colonel  Lewis  in  the  position 
from  which  he  had  driven  the  enemy — the  {)icketing, 
consisting  of  tlirec  sides  of  an  oblong  square,  on  his 
front  and  flanks^  the  longest  side  facing  the  north — and 
part  of  the  town  immediately  on  the  north  bank  of  the 
jciver  in  the  rear  of  his  troops.  I  neither  considered  the 
position  eligible,  nor  the  defence  sufficiently  firm  to 
withstand  the  assaults  of  artillery.  But  the  wounded 
of  the  battle  of  the  18th  coulil  not  he  removed — they 
were  in  the  town.  In  addition,  I  was  nearly  destitute, 
as  well  of  the  means  of  transporting  timber  from  the 
forests,  as  of  the  utensils  to  fortify  strongly ;  but  orders 
were  immediately  issued,  to  strengthen  the  works  '" 
the  best  manner  possible,  with  all  the  means  I  posses, 
ised,  and  all  that  could  be  put  in  requisition.  On  the 
evening  of  the  ^th  colonel  Wells  arrived,  and  was  di- 
rected to  encamp  on  the  right  in  ao  open  field,  imwc- 


JSt^" 


.^.r-'^'- 


ae 


fUBTORICAl^  DfiTAIf.a. 


diately  wiihout  tiie  pickeVuig.  IxitcuiUii^  lo  abaadun  np 
^ound,  uulese  Qthqr^ji'lse  pr^ered  by  Ihe  cumnwndsrin 
chief— wmtms  ilifi  muforcemeuts  and  s'lppUes,  «o  of- 
ten besought  iu  VAin,  and  intcodia«;  to  furliiy  a  more 
eligible  position  a^  i^Qon  as  possible,  /  again  wroie  to 
general  Haarisan.  'V^^  ctJiDWunication  ,w«s  trans- 
mitted by  Qolone^  W«>VU^*  who  m  t,be  a^ipe  eveaipg 


*  JV*oi5 Advices  received  siihsequently  to  the  publication  ■"' 

the  sixth  number  of  my  appeal,  bring  to  my  recollection  some 
facts,  which  will  b?  corrective  of  a  mis-statement  made  in  ""^t 
number — The  despatch  stated  in  No.  0  to  have  been  tranMnit- 
ted  tr  general  Harrison  by  Qolonel  Wells,  was  borne  by  captain 
Thomas  Smith,  of  Lexington,  K.y.  at  that  period  the  aid-d,e'Camp 
of  brigadier  genieral  iVynt'*  1**  I  *^'»  ""^  incorrect  ia  qiy  recol- 
lection, cf\ptain  Smith  and  colonel  Wells  left  tjje  camp  on  the 
An  liaisin  on  the  evening  of  the  2lst  of  Januaf^  in  company—^ 
the  former  charged  with  the  despatch,  as  well  as  verbal  intt^lli- 
genee  for  ffeneral  Harriaoii,  which  I  had  received  through  the 
medium  of  my  apies  frflip  gulden—"  the  latter  in  quqst  of  his 
baggage."  I  think  it  probable,  from  the  peculiar  ini^nTiier  io 
>vhicLb  I  felt  myself  authorized  to  dismiss  colonel  Wells,  anil 
from  the  fact  of  my  confiding  to  captain  Smith,  in  his  presence, 
the  despatch  of  which  the  coloqel  requested  to  be  the  bearer, 
that  he  was  not  extremely  well  pleased. 

Accident  or  design  induced  iolonel  Wells  to  leave  captain 
iSmith  with  an  iaexperienced  guide,  to  make  the  best  of  his  way 
to  the  Rapids — and  it  seems  he  dijl  not  arrive  at  head-quarters, 
until  rn  hour  or  two  after  colonel  Wells,  in  consequence  of  his 
Laving  been  delayed  in  procuring  a  guide  better  qualified  thau 
the  one  with  which  he  was  left. 

I  will  heie  propoimd  some  additional  queries  for  the  hero  of 
Tippecanoe : 

1st  In  the  presence  of  general  Payne  and  olhers,  on  the  arri- 
val of  colonel  Wolls  at  hoad-quarters,  what  was  th*  conversa- 
linn? 


--•4.^.- 


'\. 


HISTORICAL  DETAILS. 


n 


(Cfjuested  permiasio..'  to  return  to  the  Rapids  for  the 
alleged  purpose  of  bringing  up  his  baggage.  Leave  was 
given  him  to  depart.  The  presence  of  an  officer,  whj» 
possibly  wanted  confideivce  in  his  commander,  might 
liave  been  a  misi  ^rtun,e.  In  addition,  the  valor  of  some 
soldier  who  had  confidence  in  me,  and  was  Willing  to 
encounter  any  enemy,  in  a  cause  justifiable  on  military^ 
political  and  humane  principles,  might  have  been  lost 
to  the  service.  In  consequence  of  the  departure  of  co- 
lonel Wells,  his  command  devolved  on  major  M'Clan.. 
nahau. 

I  had  boen  in  daily  expectation,  since  the  18th  of 
January,  of  being  reinforced  from  the  comnuind  of  ge- 
neral Perkins,  with  "o  hattalion  of  infantry f  and  if  it 
eould  be  spared  a  troop  of  horse.^'    I  had  written  him 

2(1.  Di^  not  general  Harrison  remark)  that  he  had  no  doubt 
the  position  at  the  Au  Raisin  could  be  maintained  P  and  did  h^  ' 
not  warmly  approve  of  my  movem.ent  in  advance,  and  observe^ 
^  .^t  he  "  regard^  it  as  highly  important  to  the  success?  of  ffte 
<:ampaign.?^^ 

3d.  Did  or  did  not  an  officer,  who  returned  to  the  Rapids  ^'ia 
qnest  of  his  baggage,"  represent,  or  rather  misrepjresent,  to  gene- 
ral Harrison,  thut  my  camp  was  in  a  complete  state  of  disorgani- 
zation— and  did  not  this  same  officer  tradnice  me  in  t|ie  presence 
of  the  commander  in  chief  without  lOioderation,  and  unchecked 
by  general  Harrison  ? 

And,  query — Did  not  captain  Thomas  Smithj  of  Lexingtoc^, 
aid-de-camp  to  general  Payoe,  heaf  me,  previously  to  this  peri- 
od, silence  this  same  officer  when  attempting  to  load  the  reputa; 
•tion  of  geiieral  Harrison  with  infamy  in  my  presence  ? 

It  is  painful  to  any  man,  and  lays  him  under  the  liability  to, 

be  changed  with  vanity,  to  speak  thus  of  himself.    But  my  sit*-. 

ation  is  such  a  one  as  probably  to  justify  deviations  irom  e^Wi- 

nshed  rule*  of  d<'Cori»api. 
•    ^      .  E 


»«    M»^ 


y,4 


_^_j*i^^^^i;, 


m 


HISTORICAL  DETAILS. 


oil  iUe  idtli ;  lie  was  at  Lower  Sandusky.  General 
J£a.  t'ison  actnowledgeg  the  receipt  of  the  itilelligence 
contained  in  that  commnmcatiorif  on  the  iGthfUt  Upper 
Sanduski/f  a  distance  of  but  Uiirty  miles  fyom  the  Jia- 
|)ids,  and  little  more  than  sixty,  even  from  Freiichtown. 
General  Harrison  also  acknowledges  the  receipt  of 
intelligence,  resi>etting  colonel  Lewis's  advance  to 
Frenchtown,  on  ithe  night  of  the  18th ;  and  also,  that 
on  his  way  to  the  Rapids,  *'  he  met  an  express  from 
Winchester  vith  intelligence  of  the  success"  of  the  18th. 
From  the  llapids^  under  date  the  SOth,  general  Harri- 
son advised  me  of  the  movements  in  his  rear,  and  gave 
me  instructions  to  ^'  maintain  the  position  at  Au  Baisia 
at  any  rate  :"  and,  query — would  not  general  Harrison 
have  been  willing  to  reap  the  iron  harvest  of  renown, 
bad  the  position  been  maintained,  agreeably  to  what  he 
could  iiavi  ijhewn  to  have  b°en  his  oinlers  ?  And,  que- 
ry— ^had  not  general  Harrison  sufficient  time,  between 
the  i6th  of  January  and  the  33rf,  either  to  have  ordered 
a  retrograde  movement,  or  to  have  forwarded  anefjicient 
force  y 

On  the  evening  of  the  21st,  so  far  from  indulging  a 
sentiment  of  "  fatal  security,"  as  stated  in  the  <*  His- 
tory,'' spies  were  pushed  as  far  as  the  vicinity  of 
Ih'ovvnstown.  No  indications  of  an  advancing  enemy 
were  discoverable ;  and  it  is  a  fact,  since  fjilly  ascer- 
tained, that  the  troops  who  made  the  attack  on  the  mor- 
iii;:,:;  of  the  23d,  did  not  leave  Maiden  until  after  sun-set 
of  the  Slst.  Nor  is  it  true,  that  I  received  direct  infor- 
mation "  by  a  Frenchman,'**  either  before  or  after  co- 

■*  ■■■■  — .■^■■iii 

*  1  liave  fallen  into  another  error,  if  it  may  be  called  such, 
with  rc4)ect  to  a  Frcnchmanj  whom  I  had  despa!cli,r^  to  Mtt!» 


;Mmi>^^ 


Ar.^?t^:^^^^.-<^^  >' 


«,rv^ 


HISTORICAL  DETAILS. 


aa 


lonel  Wells  departed  for  the  Rapids  in  quest  of  \vg 
IrnggagCy  of  a  lafge  Indian  and  Britisli  force,  '*  which 
he  supposed  3000,"  bein;,  about  to  advance  from  Mai- 
den, "  shortly  after  he  left  it,"  for  the  purpose  of  ma- 
kin;;  an  attack.  Such  information  as  I  had  received, 
which  was  through  the  medium  of  report,  was  duly 

lien  in  quest  of  information.     I  think,  upon  rellection,  that  Ihia 
man  did  return  on  the  evening  of  the  3l8t  of  January,  and  at  the 
moment  when  I  was  scaling  the  written  despatch  trtin»mitted  h^ 
captain  Smith  'o  general  Harrison.    I  am  also  now  convinced 
that  I  d"  sired  the  bearer  of  this  letter,  to  advise  general  Harri- 
son of  the  guiii  of  intelligence  obtained  f<om  tho  spy — who  sta- 
ted in  general  lersns,  that  it  was  the  prevalent  opinion,  aniooc; 
the  people  whei  o  he  had  been,  that  the  British  were  making 
preparations  to  attack  the  American  army  at  the  Au  Taisin. 
This  information,  although  not  "  discredited  alike  by  the  officer* 
and  men,"  induced  a  belief  that  an  attack  would  probably  not  be> 
made  fur  some  days.    1  am  as  willing  to  correct  m.  error  as  H» 
maintain  tho  truth.     The  objects  embraQcd  by  this  '•  jmmuuica*. 
lion,  may  perhaps  be  considered  as  too  local  Ibr  tho  excitement 
of  general  interest.    They  may,  however,  have  a  tendency  to  bo 
of  future  service  to  my  countrymen.  They  will  probably  befoiin^ 
to  contain  a  salutary  Icssan  as  to  the  mischief  which  tan  result 
from  conflicting  candidates  for  ephemeral  pre-eminence,  wha 
start  together,  if  I  may  so  exprejss  myself,  in  the  scub-race  of 
ambition.     They  will  at  least  have  a  tendency  to  su      how  com- 
pletely the  feelings  of  public  men  should  bo  neutralized  in  the 
public  Bv- vice,  in  order  to  effectuate  great  national  objects. 

1  wiU  not  aver  positivelj,  that  my  feelings  were  not  at  all  ir- 
ritated against  general  Harrison.  I  am  aware  thattjiere  some-, 
times  exists  a  secret  bias  in  the  mind,  which  neither  vigilance 
jjor  self-examination  can  detect.  If  such  a  bias  did  exist,  the 
proofs  of  it  are  before  the  world—if  it  did  not,  the  evidence  is 
recordftd,  which  it  is  presumed  v/ill  negative  such  a  charge  if  it 
shall  ever  be  madc>-«s  also  the  documents,  which  will  have  a 
tendency,  in  this  particulafj  *o  <lo  ample  justice  to  general  Har- 
rison. J»  W- 


«<gs;.^- 


r';    ■fV^  — • 


■:-amr<^''ffv 


3& 


HISTORICAL  DETAILS' 


t'l 


comm\inicated  to  the  commander  in  chief.    Neither  is 
it  correct,  tliat  on  the  ni^^ht  of  the  31st  "not  the  least 
regard  was  paid  to  defence,  order,  regularity  or  sys- 
tem," in  posting  the  different  corps ;  but,  as  to  the  re- 
marks translated  into  the  "  History"  from  the  journal 
of  colonel  Wood,  I  have  only  to-  observe,  that  colonel 
Wood  was  in  the  rear  with  general  Harrison,  and  pro- 
bably received  his  information  from,  general  Harrison 
or  vague  report. — But  colonel  Wood  is  no  more ;  the 
reputation  of  a  fallen  hcro>  who  cannot  appear  for  him--  > 
self,  shall  be  sacred — the  world  wust  judge  between  us! 
Ok  the  nigtit  of  the  Sls^^  the  main  body  of  the  troops 
occupied  the  north  bank  of  the  river,  in  position  as  be- 
fore described — in  number  about  750.    I  was,  with  my 
etaflF  and  quarter-guard^  nearly  opposite  the  left  of  the 
picketing,  on  the  south  bank— the  river  firmly  frozen, 
and  from  eighty  to  one  hundred  yards  in  width.    On 
^hebeat  of  reveillie,  in  the  jriurningof  the22d,  an  attack 
was  mad3  from  the  north,  in  front  by  the  Biitish,  and 
on  both  flanks  by  the  ludiansv    Scarcely  a  minute  elap. 
sed,  between  the  firing  of  the  aliarm  guns  and  the  com- 
''mencement  of  the  battle.     I  was  instantly  on  tliQ 
gi'ound,*  having  only  to  cross  the  river.   I  found  every 
soldier  at  his  post.     The  command  of  major  M'Clan- 
nahan,  on  the  right,  was  my  first  o!)ject.  On  passing  to- 
ward that  wing,  I  ol)served  that  the  troops  composing  it 
were  encountering,  without  dismay,  a  most  galling  fire 
from  the  British  left,  which  they  had  then  sustained  for 
sortie  minutes.     Apprehensive  they  might  break,  and, 
in  couformity  with  my  previous  plan  in  the  event  of  fti 


*  Sec  App'jndix  0,  cajpfniu  R.  T^hti^S- 


T    . 


HISTORICAL  DETAILS, 


9T 


attack,  loriered  lieutenant  colonel  Mien  to  draw  them 
rearward,  and  bring  them  within  the  picketing.  Ho 
eflfected  the  execution  of  this  order  so  nearly,  that  the 
van  of  the  column  was  within  a  few  paces  of  the  en- 
trance where  I  stood — when  some  of  the  soldiers  mis- 
taking this  partially  retrograde  movement  for  a  retreat, 
sounded  their  own  alarms,  and  the  wing  bi^^e !  I  in^ 
stantly  directed  their  formation  under  cover  of  the  right 
bank ;  and  followed,  with  colonel  Lewis,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  effecting  it,  and  bringing  them  in.  Parts  of  two 
companies  followed  from  withi.i  the  picketing.  The 
troops  could  not  be  rallied.  The  Indians,  from  the 
Britisli  right  and  left,  precipitated  tlieir  advance — over^ 
whelmed  us  with  numbers — colonel  Alien  fell ;  colonel 
Lewis  and  myself  were  captuied. 

I  immediately  discovered,  that  we  Were  in  the  power 
of  the  noted  Huron  chief,  Roundhead — compared  witli 
whose  valor,  humanity  and  honor,  the  real  character  of 
col.  Procter,  if  ever  justice  siiall  be  done,  will  receive  a 
passport  to  imperishable  in^my !  Under  the  protection 
of  this  Huron  chief,  we  were  conducted  by  a  circuitous 
route  to  the  rear  of  the  British  lines.  Here  I  had  an 
opportunity  to  form  a  cofrect  estimate  of  their  forces. 
My  noble  countrymen  were  still  contending  with  obsti- 
nate  valor,  against  what  I  saw  was  a  strong  force,  aid- 
ed by  six  pieces  of  artillery,  which,  if  properly  mana- 
ged,  must  in  a  short  time  annihilate  the  picketing,  with 
the  hopes  of  those  within  it.  In  addition,  the  righl. 
wing,  with  which  I  had  intended  to  defend  the  rear  of 
the  picketing,  in  the  event  of  an  attack  from  the  ice  on 
the  river,  was  destroyed ;  and  my  reinforcements,  so 
long  expncled.  were.  I  knew  not  where.    1  addressed 


38 


iJISTORICAL  DETAILS. 


a'note  to  colonel  Procter,  d/esiring  to  see  him.   After  be- 
ing introduced,  he  enquired  if  I  were  the  commanding 
officer  of  the  American  forces  at  that  place.    I  replied, 
that  I  had  that  honor,  previously  to  being  made  a  pris- 
oner of  war.     He  observed,  some  of  your  troops,  sir, 
are  defending  themselves  from  the  fort  in  a  state  of  des- 
peration— had  you  not  better  surrender  them  ?  My  re- 
ply was,  ard  it  is  distinctly  remsmbered,  <^'  I  have  no 
authority  to  do  so — my  command  has  devolved  on  the 
senior  oflBccr  in  the  fort,  as  you  arc  pleased  to  call  it." 
Procter  then  in   substance  remarked,  that  the  town 
would  be  set  on  fire — and  in  the  event  of  his  being  com- 
pelled v,j  storm  the  works,  he  could  neither  be  respon- 
sible ibr  the  conduct  of  the  Indians,  nor  the  lives  of  the 
men.     On  the  contrary,  that  if  I  would  surrender  the 
troops,  he  would  be  responsible  for  both.     I  have  told 
you,  sir,  that  I  have  no  authority  over  them ;  but,  if 
you  will  send  a  flag,  I  will  recommend*  to  the  com- 
manding officer  to  surrender  himself  and  his  troops 
prisoners  of  war,  on  the  additional  conditions  that  the 
private  property  of  the  troops  shall  be  protected,  and 
the  sMe-arms  of  the  officers  returned.     It  was  to  iiiake 


*  From  any  thing  stated  in  my  communiei^iojit  to  the  war  de- 
partmeat,  under  date  the  day  afttr  the  battle  of  the  22d  of  Ja- 
nuary, no  inference  can  be  drawn,  as  to  a  wish  to  eoerce  major 
Madison  into  a  surrender.  I  certainly  desired  that  such  an  event 
r!iould  taUe  place,  to  spare  tliu  useh  effusion  of  blood.  In 
<ruth,  tlif  communication  above  alluded  to,  was  written  under 
circumstances  not  very  favorable  to  precision  of  expression. 

In  ray  report  of  the  llth  of  February,  from  Fort  George,  I 
mentioned  the  fall  of  major  M'Clannahan  erroneously.  I  had 
iiot  then  be«n  informed  of  the  manner  in  which  he  effected  hlSr 
'?scane. 


— ■  V*»*  ■ 


'"H^W"^ 


HISTORICAL  DETAILS^. 


30 


ihk  proposition,  that  I  desired  an  interview  >vith  you. 

A  flag  was  immediately  des[.  itched.    Major  Madison, 

the  senior  officer,  properly  objected  to  surrendev,  until 

a  guarantee,  for  the  protection  of  the  lives  and  property 

of  his  men,  should  be  given  by  the  commander  of  the 

Jirituh  foipces.    This  point  being  settled,  the  troops 

Jaid  down  their  arms. 

X  W. 

Tennessee— August,  1817, 


JV(?.  Vll. 

How  FAR  colonel  Procter  endeavored  to  observe  the 
stipulations  of  the  surrend  r,  and  what  exertions  he 
made  to  protect  the  prisoners,  including  the  defenceless 
wounded,  from  the  rapine  and  murder  which  succeeded 
the  cessation  of  hostilities,  may  be  inferred  from  the  fol- 
lowing exposition  of  facts  which  came  within  the  sphere 
of  my  own  observation.  Did  the  real  character  of  co- 
nel  l^rocter  merit  no  other  developement  than  as  regards 
his  utter  destitution  of  veracity,  I  would  yet  conceive 
him  worthy  to  wear  the  uniform  of  Englaiid ;  because 
a  considerable  portion  of  his  compeers  in  arms  mighfc 
not  be  found  to  disgrace  this  part  of  his  character.  But 
lie  has  had  the  good  fortune  atFrenchtowiu  to  deserve 
the  applause  of  his  government,  and  to  merit  consequent 
promotion,  by  superadding  another  wreath  of  never  dy- 
ing infamy,  to  the  garland  which  crowned  the  military 
reputaion  of  his  country  upon  the  plains  of  Indostan. 
Justice,  however,  having  been  rendered  to  the  general 


\ 


••*S<'J^2«=«a 


4D 


HISTORICAL  DETAILS. 


stamp  of  his  diaracter,  l)y  abler  pens,  I  will  only  f* 
gard,  for  the  contemplation  of  those  who  may  feel  an 
Interest  in  averting  the  disgrace  of  an  association  with 
this  man,  soma  circumstances  and  events  which  have 
probably  not  yet  arrested  the  attention  of  the  publici 
In  colonel  Procter's  official  report  to  sir  George  Pre-' 
vost,  and  sir  George's  official  staitmcnt  to  the  English 
colonial  tlepartment,  published  in  the  London  Gazette 
of  the  22d  of  April,  1813,  it  is  stated,  that  the  forces 
undet  my  command  at  Frenchtown,  amounted  to  up- 
wards of  one  thousand  men.  This  is  not  so.  My  nu- 
merical strength,  on  the  night  of  the  31st  of  January, 
1813,  has  been  already  given»i  In  the  publications  above, 
referred  to,  tlie  English  forces  are  estimated  at  1100 
men,  including  militia  and  Indians.  This  is  not  true ; 
but  the  veracitv  of  colonel  Procter  accounts  for  the  mis- 


statements of  sir  George  Prevost. 


It  is  also  stated  id 


those  documents,  that  £;overnor  Madison  surrendered  at 
discretion.  I  refer  tlije  reader  to  colonel  Procter's  in- 
tegrity, and  my  averment  on  this  subject,  previously 
made.  In  colonoA  Procter's  report,  it  is  explicitly  al- 
leged, as  a  reason  for  the  precipitate  advance  of  a  Bri- 
tish reinforcement  from  Maiden,  that  1  *'  would  have 
been  joined  by  general  Harrison  in  a  few  days  with  two 
thousand  men."  Tliis  is  a  singular  piece  of  informa- 
tion, to  come  from  a  British  oflicer,  especially  when  it. 
is  considered,  that  I  was  not  advised  of  that  fact  unlil 
after  the  triumph  of  our  arms  on  the  18th  of  January. 
No  impeachment  against  the  character  of  general  Har- 
rison, as  respects  his  fidelity  to'his  country,  isintendeil 
by  this  observatioih    It  is  made  with  the  determinatiou 


l-ilKfcir;"'''^ 


HISTORICAL  DETAILS. 


4i 


to  exhibit  all  the  qrcumstan.ces  connected  with  a  public 
calamity. 

Immediately  subsequent  to  the  surrender  of  the  Amfr* 
rican  troop^  within  the  picketing,  I  wqb  at  no  loss  to  in- 
fer the  real  disposition  of  the  victors,  from  theii'  sangui- 
nary exultations  over  the  vanquished.  The  British 
and  Indian  forces  had  suffered  severely  in  the  contest-^/ 
and  were  intoxicated  with  the  renown  of  a  victory,  ovei 
such  obstinate  valmr  as  had  mown  down  their  ranks. 

It  is  in  the  nature  of  man  to  hate  what  he  fears;  and 
it  is  ir  '■     ^atuivs  of  a  coward  to  exercise  cruelty  to- 
ward    v<       ished  enemy.   Genuine  bravery  and  mili- 
tary \   "      rf.re  invariably  connected  with  compassion, 
even  for  the  distresses  of  an  antagonist.     How  well  the 
name  of  colonel  Procter  comports  with  what  ought  to  be 
the  real  character  of  a  soldier,  will  be  shewn.     I  was 
standing  near  this  man,  when  my  brave  countrymen  laid 
down  their  arms.     Instead  of  endeavoring  to  enforce 
the  stipulations  of  the  surrender,  he  deliberately  jjer- 
mitbed  the  savages  to  plunder  those  who  had  anything 
to  lose.     My  remonstrances  against  this  tacit  encou- 
ragement of  so  disgraceful  a  scene  of  rapine,  were  vain. 
He  cooly  answered,  that  the  Indians  could  not  be  con- 
trolled !    How  true  this  assertion  was,  may  be  iofered 
from  the  fact,  that  the  Indians  were  actually  overawed 
by  the  resistance  made  on  the  part  of  some  of  the  pris- 
oncrs.    But  the  effect  of  this  resintance  was  of  short 
dotation.    The  plundering  was  re-commenced,  persis- 
ted in,  and  finished,  by  the  allioy  of  his  Britannic  ma- 
jesty, in  the  presence  of  his  magnanimous  representa* 
tives  1  They  were  next  permitted  to  i^tain  a  number 

F 


\>  l  ■  I 


,4e"'Ti».... 


^■,„Xm^..f^ 


I 


4» 


HISTORIC^VL  DETAILS, 


of  the  unfortunate  men  vvlion  they  had  taken,  for  cap. 
tivity  among  themselves.  On  (Hscoveiing  this  infernal 
exhibition  of  outrage  on  humanity,  I  made  every  appeal 
to  the  feelings,  tlie  dignity,  and  honor  of  this  British 
colonel — to  do  justice  to  wliose  real  character,  the  Eng- 
lish language  does  not  afford  epithets  of  opprolbrium  or 
disgrace,  sufficiently  powerful  or  descriptive.  I  fotnid 
it  vain  to  appeal  to  a  man  whose  trade  is  rapii:e,  and 
whose  bread  is  murder,  and  saw  many  of  the  prisonere 
bound,  and  driven  off  by  the  Indians.  Among  others,  a 
youth  approached  the  place  wliere  Procter  and  myself 
were  i&tanding,  whose  arms  were  bound  behind  him,  from 
which  a  rope  was  extended,  and  in  the  hands  of  a  sa- 
vage. This  youth  endeavoured  to  enforce  the. interces- 
sion I  was  making,  and  with  all  the  eloquence  of  dis- 
tress, proffered  to  colonel  Procter  every  thing  lie  pos- 
sessed, and  all  he  ever  should  possess,  if  he  would  re- 
lease and  place  him  with  his  fellow  prisoners,  under  the 
British  guard.  He  told  him  he  had  a  widowed  mo- 
ther, dependent  on  his  liberty  and  life  for  subsistence, 
whose  heart  would  be  broken  if  he  should  never  return ! 
My  heart  bleeds,  even  at  this  late  period,  at  the  recol- 
lection of  such  a  scene  of  depravity  triumphant,  and 
virtue  in  the  dust.  1  observed  to  Procter,  that  the  terms 
of  the  surrender  were  violated — that  it  was  due  to  him- 
self as  a  British  officer,  and  to  his  gjvernmeht,  to  in- 
terfere— and  again  appealed  to  E.iglish  justice  and  mag- 
nanimity. "  Ah  !"  he  replied,  "  do  you  acknowledge 
that  '.here  are  such  things  in  existence,  as  British  jus- 
lice  and  magnanimity  ?  1  ara  glad  to  hear  it.  Therein 
1)0  danger  of  the  young  man.    The  Indians  never  huri: 


•,-•'<? 


HISTORIC xVL  DETAILS.  m 

a  prisoner.    Moreover,  the  Indians  took  him,  and  we 
never  force  prisoners  from  them." 

The  tribunal  which  should  have  brought  this  mis- 
creant to  an  account,  should  blush  for  his  promotion ; 
but  the  dr/  is  not  far  distant,  when  the  malediction  de- 
nounced by  eternal  justice  against  iniquity,  willproba- 
bly  put  it  in  the  power  of  American  valor  to  avenge, 
these  outrages  against  her  citizens,  and  to  crumble  into, 
atoms  this  herculean  iniquity— the  colossus  of  British 
power.     Had  sir  Guy  Carltdn,  the  brightest  military 
gem  that  ever  ornamented  the  diadem  of  England,  been 
in  the  situation  of  colonel  Procter,  what  would  have, 
been  his  conduct  ?    It  would  have  been  on  a  par  with 
the  sentiments  uttered  by  lord  Chatham,  when  the  pro- 
posal  was  made  in  the  Tritish  house  of  lords,  to  employ 
the  Indians  against  us  in  the  revolution  of  '76.     Some 
of  the  noble  members  observed,  that  England  had  a  right 
to  employ  all  the  means  against  us,  which  God  and  na- 
ture had  put  within  her  reach.     Chatham  rose,  and  re- 
peated  three  times  emphatically,  in  succession,  the 
words  <»GoD  AND  NATURE,"  and  concluded,  ^*  Methinks 
I  see  the  portrait  of  the  ancestor  of  the  noble  lord  who 
made  use  of  this  argument,  start  from  the  canvas,  and 
blush  for  the  degeneracy  of  such  a  son."    But  it  appears 
that  governments,  like  men,  can  progress  in  injustice, 
and  depravity. 

On  the  33d,  the  prisoners  who  remained  in  the  power 
of  colonel  Procter,  with  the  exception  of  the  wounded 
who  coulu  not  be  removed,  were  taken  to  Maiden.  It 
may  not  be  improper  here  to  remark,  that  the  wounded 
of  the  battle  of  the  18th  occupied  the  house  which  was 
4lcsigned  for  my  quarters.  But,  liitbcr  than  subject  them 


m 


HISTORICAL  DETAILS. 


,  %  \ 


to  the  severity  of  such  weather  as  we  expedenced  at 
that  period,  I  crossed  the  river,  and  occupied  a  more 
exposed  situation.  I  note  this  fact,  that  it  may  be  in- 
corporated in  the  second  edition  of  the  "  HistoFy  of  the 
War  in  the  Western  Country."  I  note  it  to  prove,  that 
humanity  had  some  share  in  what  colonel  Wood^s  jour- 
nal attributes  to  other  causes.  On  my  departure  from 
this  arena,  this  field  of  massacre,  I  requested  colonel 
Procter  to  leave  a  guard  for  the  protection  of  the  woua« 
ded,  a,^ainst  the  butchery  which  I  apprehended.  lie 
ODolly  replied,  that  they  would  b£  taken  care  of. 
Here  again  permit  me  to  contrast  the  character  of  colo- 
nel ProcLor  with  what  would  have  been  the  conduct  of 
the  conqueror  of  Montgomery— the  man  who  would 
have  exclaimed  W'^'i  Busirius,  when  he  was  shewn  the 
body  of  Mcmnon  among  the  slain,  "  Here  ends  tlw 
contest ;  I  war  not  with  the  dust'^— ^Sir  Guy  Carlton 
would  have  left  a  guard  safficient  for  the  protection  of 
tli£  wounded,  and  with  its  commander,  a  letter  to  gene- 
ral Harrrson  in  nearly  these  words.:  *•  lam  apprized 
af  youy  advance^  icith  a  force  1  am  unable  ia  withstand. 
The  laws  of  nations  command,  Uiat  in  peace  wb  should 
do  as  much  service^  and  in  war  as  little  injury  to  each 
other,  as  comports  with  our  own  interest.  Ileum  a. 
guard,  sir,  for  the  protection  of  your  wounded^  who 
cannot  he  removed  irithout  endangering  their  lives. 
Tfie  soldiers  composing  it  are  not  to  be  considered  pris- 
oners of  ivarJ^  In  sucli  an  event,  I  will  venture  to  as- 
sert, that  mun  lia§  never  yet  worn  the  uniform  of  the 
United  States,  who  would  have  dared  to  consider  suqIi 
a  guard  as  prisoners.  After  my  arrival  at  Maiden,  I 
learned  the  melaucholy  fate  of  the  wounded  who  were 


HISTORICAL  DETAILS. 


4fe 


left  at  Frenclitown,  itnd  insistod  upon  an  interview 
mth  colonel  Procter. 

J.  W. 
Tennessee — August,  I8I7. 


j\ro.  viiL 

HuBSbQUENTLY  to  my  arrival  at  Maiden,  as  previ. 
uusly  noticed,  I  learned  from  doctor  Todd  the  melan- 
choly doom  of  the  wounded  prisoners  who  had  been 
left  at  Frenchtown,  and  sent  for  colonel  Procter. 

Before,  however,  detailing  the  particulars  of  this  con- 
ference with  him,  it  may  not  be  improper  to  mark  his 
conduct  toward  the  prisoners  who  were  brought  to  Mai- 
den. Immediately  after  tlieir  arrival,  notwithstanding' 
my  most  pointed  remonstrances  against  it — .notwith- 
standing  the  severity  of  the  weather,  and  the  nakedness' 
of  the  prisoners,  they  v/ct-e  confined  in  a  lumber  or  hnat 
l/ard,  strongly  enclosed  around,  but  entirely  undc  '  nded 
ironi  above.  Thus  situated,  they  were  exposeu  until 
tlie  S4?th,  first  to  intense  cold,  and  aftenvards  to  a  heavy 
fall  of  sao'7  and  ra'n.  Their  siiualion  becoming  des- 
perate on  the  21th,  I  prevailed  on  col.  Procter  to  assent 
to  their  removal — and  the  humarnity  of  this  British  officer 
placed  them  in  an  open  warehouse,  where  fire  could  not 
be  kept,  and  where  nothing  prevented  their  perishing 
with  cold,  but  the  circumstance  of  such  numbers  being 
trowded  together  in  so  confined  a  space. 
'*  When  Procter  made  his  appearance  agreeably  to  re- 
quest, I  related  to  him  circumstantially,  as  communicated 
by  doctor  Todd,  from  whom  Iha  intelligence  had  been 


»? 


a  4 


\C'S'£3f'^    — ■> 


"■jy.afefe^stiife^tiil 


tf 


IIISTOKICAL  DETAILS. 


obtained,  the  particulars  of  the  iinprecedentecl  scene  of 
biitcliery  at  Frenchtown.  He  expressed  doubts  as  to  the 
authpnticlty  of  the  statement,  and  affected  in  be  surpri. 
8ud;  if  indeed  it  were  trae  that  the  Indians  could  per- 
petrate such  atrocities  ;  but  when  doctor  Todd,  who  had 
been  a  witness  to  their  commission,  authenticated  the 
relation,  he  replied,  with  consummate  obduracy,  not  un- 
mixed with  exultation,  "The  Indians  could  not  be 
controlled — I  left-  a  guard — I  am  not  unaware,  that  I 
shall  he  slandered  throus;hout  the  United  States." 

Tliis  magnanimous  British  hero  was  mistaken,  as  to 
the  truth  of  all  his  allegations.  The  Indians  could 
have  been  controlled ;  but,  strictly  in  character  with 
numbers,  of  his  compatriots  in  arins,  he  permitted  the 
allies  of  his  most  gracious  sovereign  to  sw«ll  the  cata^ 
logue  of  carnage,  for  the  admiration  of  a  deluded  popu. 
lace  at  home,  and  for  the  grati&cation  of  a  government^ 
which  he  knew  wodd  promote  him  in  proportion  to  thft 
numbers  he  could  destroy,,  no  matter  by  what  means! 

Ho  did  not  leave  aguakd — and  an  appeal  to  the  laws 
of  bis  own  country,  will  inform  this  enlightened  and 
humane  civilian,  that  truth  is  not  slander.  In  truth, 
without  intending  any  thing  complimentary  to  the 
jurisprudence  of  his  country,  it  is  to  be  deplored  by 
most  nations  of  the  world,  that  the  depraved  political 
policy  of  that  country  should  be  so  completely  subver- 
sive of  the  genuine  spirit  ofh^r  laws,  as  to  sh  (ild  such 
miscret',nts  as  Procter  from  the  sword  of  judicial  power; 
Impunity  has  too  long  been  permittiMl  to  embolden  ia 
outrage  the  unprincipled  minions  of  the  British  crown—- 
and  hence  have  probably  ari<*en  some  of  the  most  san- 
giiiaary  national  contests  of  moderu  ages.    From  the 


<;i 


^^r-mr", 


HISTOP'CAL  DETAILa 


47 


enormities  practised!  against  the  liberties  and  lives  of 
American  seamen,  and  such  deeds  as  the  murder  of 
Pierce  in  the  harbor  of  New  York,  n»ay  be  clfearly  in- 
ferred, the  causes  of  a  war  which  has  prostrated  the 
naval  supremacy  of  England.  But  these  observations 
are  principally  made  with  a  hope,  tiiat  they  may  arrest 
the  attention  of  the  only  tribunal  coni{)elcnt  to  redeem 
humanity  from  ihe  disgrace  sustained  at  FrenchtowU' — 
that  the  country  of  a  Procter  may  be  enabled  to  record 
one  act  of  justice,  admonitory  of  such  heroes  as  those  of 
Hampton  and  Havre  de-grace — and  that  she  may  yet 
enregister  among  the  archives  of  heaven,  one  solitary 
proof,  that  she  is  not  thoroughly  depraved  ! 

Had  it  been  my  misfortune  to  be  present  at  the 
"  massacre  of  Raisin,'^  I  would  here  disclose  in  detail, 
Uie  tragical  horrors  of  that  never  to  be  forgotten  scene* 
But  ample  justice  will  unquestionably  be  done  to  those 
events,  by  historians  whose  feelings  will  be  less  liable 
to  bias  than  my  own  ;  and  by  men  who  will  not  fail  to 
administer  strict  and  impartial  Justice  to  the  characters 
of  colonel  Henry  Procter,  general  William  Henry  Har- 
rison, and  James  Winchester.  To  those  of  the  presen-t 
age,  who  may  wish  to  be  informed,  from  the  best  au.- 
thority  extant,  of  the  particular  circumstances  and  indi- 
vidual butcheries  involved  in  this  general  mui-der,  I 
know  of  no  work  in  which  the  slaughters  of  the  Au 
Raisin  are  more  faithfully  portrayed,  than  in  a  history 
of  the  late  war,  *•'  written  by  an  American,  and  pub- 
lished by  Joseph  Gushing,  Xo.  6,  Howard  street,  Bal- 
timore." 

li  may  not  be  uninteresting,  here  to  tnkc  a  concise 
jl'pvjow  of  the  principal  facts,  noted  in  this  and  the  pr^"- 


»-****^ 


#""'«Miii 


tt*/^mmt.Mm 


48 


llISTOmCAL  OETAlIiH. 


ceding  numbers.  I  do  this  witli  tiio  intention  of  ialrrf- 
ducing  some  documciitai'y  evidc  e,  liavitig  relation  to 
those  publicativ^ns,  not  yet  adduced. 

On  the  reception  of  intellij^ence  of  the  fall  of  Detroit, 
I  assumed  the  command  at  Newport  and  Cincinnati,  of 
a  detachment  of  troops  under  colonel  Wells.  This 
command  wan  relinquished  to  general  Uarrif^on,  under 
the  circura»ta»ces  and  for  the  reasons  heretofbre  noticed, 
who  marched  those  troops  to  Fort  Wayne.  I  then  re- 
ceived peremptory  orders  from  the  war  department  to 
talCD  command  of  the  north-western  army.  I  did  ao, 
at  Fort  Wayne ;  and  advised  general  Harrison,  on  his 
<leparture  from  thence,  that  1  intended  on  the  next  day 
to  move  for  Defiance.  Ho  promised,  on  his  way  toward 
the  rear,  to  hasten  forward  troops  and  supplies.  How 
Jie  was  employed,  may  be  i:  ft*red  from  Appendix,  B, 
C,  D,  F,  H,  L,  Q. 

I  marched  from  Fort  Wayne  to  Defiance,  witli  2200 
effective  troops — re- edified  the  old  fort  and  store- hou- 
ses, a^d  awaited  supplips.  Instead  of  supplies,  gene- 
ral Harrison  arrived  with  a  commission  from  the  war 
department,  and  I  was  superseded.  He  assumed  the 
command,  inspected  the  vi'orks,  ascertained  the  state  of 
supplies,  and  departwi.  I  next  received  orders  from 
him  to  march  for  the  Rapids,  at  which  point  he  had  ad- 
vised rac  a  junction  of  the  wings  and  centre  of  tlie  north- 
western army  would  be  effected.  Accompanying  these 
i>rders  to  march,  were  assurances  of  meeting  at  ih'.  Ila- 
p'  a  detachment  of  troops  under  general  Tupper, 
with  supplies.*    Three  day  4  after  the  march  of  the  ar- 


*  See  Appcnilix,  B,  E,  latter  part. 


,-j»4j^'.J^n»*fj5 


IIISTOBICAL  D'iTAlLa 


49 


of 


80, 


my,  :  u  obedience  to  these  orders,  another  was  received 
from  him  to  nhaiidon  the  idea  of  advancing,  unless  the 
troops  had  moved.  They  had  moved^  and  this  con- 
tingency avoided  the  last  order. 

The  army  lay  some  lays  at  the  llapids,  but  neither 
f;eneml  Tuppei  or  ipplies  arrived.  During  this  time, 
those  imperious  c  for  a  movement  on  Frenchtown 
occurred,  which  dei  mined  me  to  ad',  Ance  In  truth, 
had  no  other  reasons  been  given  for  this  movement  than 
those  founded  in  humanity,  and  those  already  noticed, 
the  plan  of  the  campaign,  to  form  a  junction  of  the  fo"- 
cesat  the  Rapids,  would  have  had  considerable  weight. ^- 
Tiie  army  advanced  upon  Frenchtown,  and  the  eveuts 
have  been  detailed. 

When  we  were  made  prisoners  on  the  22d  of  Janu- 
ary, general  Harrison,  with  a  heavy  reinforcement,  was 
six  miles  in  advance  of  the  Rapid >  Gove*'uor  Madi- 
son, under  oath,  states  it  as  his  opinion,  that  a  rein- 
foiccmant  of  50r  men  at  Frenchtown  would  have  en- 
sured a  victory.t  I  assert,  that  it  would  have  done  more. 
It  woidd  have  led  to  the  immediate  reduction  of  Mai- 
den, and  given  perfect  security  to  the  inhabitants  of  the 
Michigan  territory.  I  here  again  repeat  the  interro- 
gatories formerly  propounded.  Would  not  general 
Harrison  have  been  willing  to  reap  the  iron  harvest  of 
renown,  had  the  position  been  maintained? — I  will 
here  add  some  other  queries,  for  the  .solution  of  gene- 
ral Harrihun : 


»  See  No.  III.  quotation  from  i^eneral  Harrison's  letter  to  the 
secretary  at  war,  near  the  «.  >r.f^lusioa. 

t  See  Appendix,  B  aad  J,  l^iadisoa's  ftml  Lewi.s'a  opioions  on 
this  subject. 


30 


HISTORICAL  DETAILS. 


1st.  How  far  was  lie  from  Frenclitown,  when  tlie 
icformation  reached  him  of  the  disaster  at  Raisin  ? 

Sd.  What  force  had  he,  and  how  many  pieces  of  a,r- 
tillery  ? 

3d.  Compared  with  the  length  of  time  consumed  in 
liis  advance}  how  jhort  a  time  did  it  take  him  to  retreat 
to  his  former  position,  after  receiving  intelligence  of  my 
defeat  and  capture  on  the  23d  ? 

4th.  What  was  the  value  of  provisions  and  storesy 
destroyed  for  the  United  States  at  the  Rapids  on  hisf 
retreat  ? 

I  consider  it  needless  to  add  any  thing  more,  on  a 
suhject  connected,  not  with  a  defence  of  my  conduct, 
but  witi)  my  appeal  from  the  decision  of  a  tribunal, 
which  perhaps  had  prejudged  me.  I  have  given  a  fair, 
and  as  far  as  possible  an  impartial,  history  of  my  mo- 
'  es  and  conduct,  whilst  in  the  puhlic  service  at  the 
north ;  and  aa  before  observed,  I  rely  on  the  justice  of 
my  contemporaries,  and  on  posterity,  foi  a  ftat  which 
nothing  can  destroy. 

J.  W. 

-Tennessee — duguPt,  1817. 


.?V0.  IX, 

On  the  i)37th  page  of  the  "  Histonj  of  the  Late  War 
hi  the  Western  Country,'^  I  find  that  my  military  con- 
duct at  Mobile  iias  also  bcea  honored  with  the  notice 
of  the  historian,  I  ought  perhaps  to  experience  emo- 
tions, either  of  complacency  or  terror,  at  seeing  my  name 


dier, 


{fm^^HXTi 


-^mFTI 


HISTORICAL  DETAILS. 


fil 


embodied  in  liistory  at  so  early  a  period  of  time ;  and 
would  unquestionably  feci  cither  the  former  or  the  lat- 
ter, were  I  not  now  convinced,  tiiat  a  developcment  of 
f'e  genuine  character  of  a  few  sentences  of  that  work, 
having  relation  to  my  conduct  at  Mol)ile,  will  render  the 
volume  equally  impotent  to  eulogize  or  condemli.  If, 
however,  when  brought  to  the  tribunal  of  sound  judg- 
ment, the  following  assertions  shall  be  found  authentic, 
i  will  legitimate-their  claim  to  attention,  and  furnish  them 
with  a  passport  to  posterity  ;  and  if,  on  the  other  hand, 
Ihey  shall  be  found  incorrect,  I  trust  that  the  magnaui- 
I  mity  of  the  writer,  who  is  bound  to  sustain  the  character 
he  has  assumed,  will  impel  bim  to  an  open  and  candid 
acknowledgement  of  his  errors. 

The  writer  remarks  :— '^  General  Winchester,  tvho 
liad  lately  been  exchanged,  and  returned  home  from 
Canada,  was  now  entrusted  with  the  command  at  Mo- 
bile, for  the  jirotectmi  of  ivhich  he  had  an  ample  force f 
consisting  of  the  Georgia  militia,  the  Tennessee  militia 
under  Taylor,  and  several  other  smaller  corps.  On  (he 
8th  of  February  the  enemy  invested  Fort  Bowyer  with 
a  formidable  armament  by  land  and  water.  Tliey  madd 
regular  approaches  by  laud,  and  had  advanced  within 
thirty  yards  of  the  ditches,  when  colonel  Lawi-ence,  by 
advice  of  his  officers,  determined  to  capitulate,  as  there 
vvas  no  possibility  of  maintaining  the  post  much  longer. 
Though  he  obtained  highly  honorable  terms  for  liis 
troops,  and  was  perfectly  justifiable  in  making  a  sur- 
render, yet  such  an  event  was  painful  to  a  gallant  sol- 
dier, who  had  been  accustomed  to  victory.  General 
Winchester  was  much  blamed  for  the  result ;  for,  al- 
though  he  had  a  sufficiency  of  soldics  at  the  town  of 


tl 


'% 


mm 


HISTORICAL  DETAILS* 

Mobile,  and  had  been  ajijirized  of  the  intentions  of  the 
enemy  previous  to  their  landing,  yet  he  had  delayed  to 
send  a  reinforcement  to  Lawrence,  until  the  siege  had 
commenced,'^  &c. 

I  might  here  express  astonishment  at  the  cnloring 
with  which  errors  may  be  given  to  the  world.  I  might 
liere  express  astonishment  at  the  boldness  of  assertion 
with  whieli  misstatements  may  be  promulgated — and 
by  men  who  must  have  labored  under  an  almost  entire 
l>rivation  of  intelligence,  as  to  facts  and  circumstances. 
But  1  will  here  venture  to  assert,  and  endeavor  to  sup- 
port the  allegations  with  ample  proof,  that  at  the  time 
the  above  paragraph  was  dignified  with  the  sacred  cha- 
racter of  history,  the  writer  must  have  been  ignorant  of 
my  numerical  strength— of  my  facilities  of  transporta- 
tion— of'the  ovcrwheliuing  weight  and  force  of  the  ar- 
mament with  which  the  British  attacked  Fort  Bowyer — 
of  the  plan  of  defensive  operations— and  of  the  whole 
coast,  town,  and  fortress  to  be  defended— and  yet  is 
this  romance  entitled  a  "  History  !'' 

First,  as  to  his  want  of  information,  touching  my  nu- 
merical strength.  Tlie  writer  alleges  that  I '  ad  a  force 
which  iucldded  the  Geors^ia  militia.  I  insert  for  his 
considcM'atioJi,  and  the  correction  of  a  future  edition  of 
bis  work,  the  following  quotation  from  a  communica- 
tion, written  by  general  M-Intosh,  who  commanded  the 
r2;ia  trooos.  It  is  dated  at  Fort  Claiborne,  130 
miles  In  the  rear— and  dated,  too,  the  very  day  on 
which  t!ie  British  invested  Fort  Bowyer : 

"FEBRUARY 8th,  1815.   Claiborne. Sir— Your 

'  letter  of  tne  ;eoth  ult.  I  had  thu  honor  of  receiving  to- 
'  d tiy  froGi  colonel  Johuson,  commanding  at  tiiis  post. 


HISTORICAL  DETAILS. 


5d 


IT- 


♦  I  arrived  a  few  hours  siuec,  with  a  part  of  my  detach- 

<  ment,  by  forced  marches  from  Fort  Decatur,  bringin- 

*  with  me  provisions  for  ten  days  only— leaving  a  bat- 

<  talion  under  the  command  of  colonel  Boothe,  who  was 

<  to  set  out  a  few  days  after  me  in  large  boats,  built  for 

<  the  conveyance  of  provisions  to  Mobile  for  tlie  detach- 
^  ment  under  my  command.  I  was  to  have  been  sup- 
«  plied  by  '  ira  at  this  place,  to  enable  me  to  continue 
^  my  march.     His  not  arriving  places  me  in  a  dilemma. 

<  0)ie  regiment  of  my  command  was  detained  by  the 
i  •'overnor  of  Georgia,  in  consequence  of  a  sudden  in- 

<  vasion  of  the  enemy  in  different  quarters  of  the  sea- 

*  board." 

It  must  now  be  needless  to  remark,  Uiat  the  Msto- 
vian  is  mistaken,  as  to  the  presence  of  the  Georgia 
troops  at  Mobile  on  the  day  of  the  fall  of  Fort  Bow- 
yer— and  unless  he  can  endow  them  with  ubiquity,  jus- 
tice would  seem  to  require  a  corrective  of  this  part  of 
his  work.  The  fact  is,  that  this  force  did  not  reach 
Mobile  until  the  S3d  of  February. 

Til  is  writer  also  alleges,  that  1  iiossessed  an  ample 
force  for  the  protection  of  Mobile.     I  am  something  at 
a  loss  to  understand  what  definite  strength  the  writer 
means,  by  the  words  ample  force.   Do  these  words  in- 
tend one  hundred  men,  or  one  hundred  thousand  men? 
Or  ought  they  always  to  have  reference  to  the  strength 
to  be  contended  against?    But  the  writer  has  neither 
stated  my  numerical  strength,  nor  the  weight  and  force 
of  th'-  British  armament  which  appeared  off  Mobile.— 
From  whence,  then,  from  what  data  did  lie  draw  the 
sapient  inference,  that  ^^  for  the  protection  qf  Mobile  I 
had  an  ample  force  r*^ 


• 


•'^^_ 


....fc.aaa-faiM.iftMaAt'Siatt^ife^*'  ""■'\f 


04 


I1IST0RICA^  DETAILS. 


The  truth  is,  that  «n  the  marniiis  of  the  10th  of  Feb- 
luai'V  my  numerical  force  amounted  to  but  seventeeti 
htmttred  men  capable  of  performing  duty — and  this 
number,  small  as  it  was,  included  the  militia  from  East 
Tennessee,  who  amvcd,  miserably  armed,  on  the  even- 
in"'  preceding,  worn  down  by  forced  marches.  It  will 
1)6  distinctly  remembered,  that  the  Georgia  troops  un- 
der general  M'lntosh  were  still  one  hundred  and  thirty 
miles  in  the  rear.  The  number,  then,  i700,  must  ba 
ihc  ample  force  recorded  by  the  historian. 

A  comparison  of  this  force  with  the  strength  of  gene- 
ral Lambert,  will  shew  conclusively  how  ample  it  was. 
In  a  conimunicaiiou  from  colonel  Lawrence,  dated  at 
Fori  Bowyer  on  the  7th  of  Febfuary,  which  communi- 
cation, notwithstanding  the  greatest  exertions  of  that 
excellent  officer,  did  not  reach  me  until  late  in  the  night 
of  the  9th,  will  be  found  the  following  notification  as 
to  the  British  armament :  "  The  adverse  winds  and 
boisterous  weather,  since  writing  the  enclosed,"  [allu^ 
ding  to  a  letter  dated  on  the  6th]  «•'  have  prevented  my 
transmitting  you  intelligence  by  water.  Captain  Chara- 
berlaitt  put  off  this  morning,  but  was  compelled  to  re- 
turn. 1  despatch  a  man  by  way  of  Eon  Secours,  in 
hope  he  may  meet  with  a  passage  from  Dolive's  lau- 
ding, on  the  east  side  of  the  bay,  to  cross  and  give  the 
intelligence  of  the  approach  of  the  enemy,  &c.  Tlie 
number  of  the  eubaiy's  vessels  has,  since  yesterday  sun- 
setting,  increased,  and  is  hourly  increasing.  Twenty, 
tivo  sail  are  now  at  anchor  icithin  six  miles  distance. 
Should  the  weather  prove  more  favorable,  1  will  start 
captain  Chamberlaiu  witli  such  further  information  ^s 

UCCll^S.-'* 


HISTORICAL  DETAILS. 


05 


From  the  above  quotation,  some  idea  may  be  formed 
cf  the  weight  of  the  British  naval  force  off  Fort  Bow- 
yer  on  the  7tli  of^Febvuary.    What  military  numerical 
strength  was  afloat  in  this  fleet  and  its  transports,  can- 
not be  determined  with  any  degree  of  precision.    It  is 
however  probable,  that  general  Lambert-put  forth  nearly 
all  his  military  power  in  the  investiture  of  Fort  Bow- 
yer  by  land— jit'e  ihoiisand  men* — and  I  have  little 
doubt,  that  h:^  not  the  ardor  of  general  Lambert's  feel- 
ings been  damped,^and  his  troops  disheartened,  by  the 
dreadful  slaughter' before  New- Orleans,  Mobile  and 
not  Fort  Bowyer  would  have  been  his  object.     There 
were,  as  I  shall  endeavour  to  prove,  mediims  of  ap- 
jiroach  to  MoMUj  with  such  facilities  of  transportation 
as  those  possessed  by  the  British  general,  other  than 
the  reduction  of  this  petty  fortress  ;  the  variety  of  which, 
produced  a  pre-concerted  plan  between  colonel  Law- 
rence and  myself,  which  shall  be  detailed  in  a  subse- 
iiuent  communication.   Query.— had  I  an  ample  force  ? 

J.  W, 

Tennessee — August,  1817. 


Some  remarks,  touching  the  local  and  relative  posi- 
tion of  Fort  Bowyer,  may  not  be  entirely  uninteresting 


*  The  British  officers,  in  an  interview  on  Dauphine  Island, 
subsequently  to  the  conclusion  of  peace,  with  colonel  RuBsell 
and  captain  W.  L.  Uobison,  acknowledged  the  investiture  nf  Fort 
Bowyer  with  5000  men. 


-.»^^^ 


S(«.S>  ««eww«9i»tiM»««iii 


mi 


50 


HISTORICAL  DETAILS. 


to  the  exposition  of  facts  contained  in  this  number— ht- 
asmuch  as  thej-  may  have  a  tendency  to  allay  the  fever 
of  British  exultation  over  the  fail  of  this  "Gibraltar  of 
America,"  and  to  furnish  future  "  historians"  with  an 
accurate  knowledge  of  the  place  they  would  describe. 
This  fort  stands  on  a  sandy  peninsula,  Mobile  point, 
distant  from  the  town  of  Mobile,  by  land  65  miles,  by 
water  30.     It  is  constructed  of  pine  timber  and  sand— 
:  Mfl  being  tolerably  well  calculated  for  a  water  battery, 
i     i  great  degree  commands  the  eastern  passage  into 
\i,-  li\y  of  Mobile.     But  there  is  also  a  western  inlet,. 
Pa«^.  Merone,  admitting  vessels  drawing  five  feet  wa- 
ter, imiuediately  northwestwardly  of  Dauphine  Island, 
V'hich  lies  nearly  in  the  mouth  of  the  bay.     It  was 
throfigh  the  medium  of  this  pass  that  our  coasters  and 
guu  boats  usually  kept  up  the  communication  between 
the  town  ot  Mobile  and  New- Orleans,  on  which  I  had 
to  rely  for  supplies  ;  and  a  single  British  gun-boat  or 
barge,  well  manned,  was  competent  at  any  time,  such 
was  my  iittev  destitution  of  naval  force,  not  only  to 
block  up  this  pass,  but  to  intercept  supplies  from  a^ove, 
destined  for  Fort  Bnwyer. 

The  eastern  shore  of  the  bay,  from  a  point  nearly 
opposite  the  town,  along  the  whole  coast  downward,  is 
a  desen  of  swamps,  wilderness,  and  sand  banks.  la 
truth,  it  is  considered  that  the  peuinsula  is  of  such  a 
descri  prion,  a  short  distance  in  the  rear  of  th£  fort,  that 
had  a  British  naval  armament  been  anchored  abreast 
this  isthmus  on  both  sides,  a  fire  could  have  been  pour- 
ed upon  it,  which  must  have  insured  the  destruction  of 
five  thousand  troops  actiog  in  concert  with  the  garrison. 


A 


\ 


HISTORICAL  liETAItS. 


57 


the  western  coast  of  the  bay,  from  the  town  of  Mo- 
bile  down  to  the  south  margin  of  the  island  of  Mon- 
Loftis,  and  from  thence  westwardly  along  the  slwre  of 
the  gulf,  affords  a  number  of  easy  passes  and  conveni- 
ent landings  for  barges  in  the  direction  of  Mobile.    In 
fact,  with  the  forces  and  ordnance  possessed  by  gene- 
rals Lambert  and  Keane,*  added  to  the  facility  with 
which  it  is  well  known  barges  can  be,  and  are  always 
btiilt  from  materials  kept  on  board  the  British  fleet,  the 
enemy  might  have  effected  a  landing  at  Monveille  Cove, 
about  three  miles  south  of  Mobile.    This  is  the  pla^e 
at  which  general  Wilkinson  landed,  when  he  possessed 
the  United  States  of  the  toWn.     Or  general  Lambert 
mieht  have  ascended  Dog  river,  which  enters  the  bay 
from  the  north-west,  only  ten  miles  south  of  the  town. 
This  river  is  as  deep  as  any  paxt  of  the  bay.     Its  na- 
vigation would  have  enabled  the  British  commander  to 
place  himself  within  tive  miles  of  the  town.  Or  he  might 
have  effected  a  landing  at  Oyster  Pass,  which  separates 
the  main  land  of  the  western  coast  of  the  bay  from  the 
island  of  Mon  Louis ;  by  doing  which,  he  would  have 
had  a  ridge  on  which  to  advance.     Or  he  could  have 
landed  between  Oyster  Pass  and  the  bay  of  Pascagola 
and  marched  to  Mobile  in  thirty  hours.     Or  he  mjght 
have  ascended  Pascagola,  to  a  point  due  west  of  Mo- 
bile     This  river  falls  into  the  gulf  about  twenty  miles 
west  of  Oyster  Pass,  and  is  navigable  for  barges  up  to 
a  point  nearly  west  of  the  town  of  Mobile.     In  tru  h, 
vithout  ascending  the  Pascagola  even  a  single  mile; 


*  See  note  at  the  end  of  tbis  number. 


•OS* 


58 


HISTORICAL  DETAILS. 


general  Larubeirt  "Would  have  been  wilhiu  thirty-five 
miles  of' the  town. 

Now,  comparing  the  British  naval  and  military  for- 
ces with  seventeen  hundred  men,  had  £  ^'an  ample  force 
for  the  protection  of  Mobile  ?"  But  ^hat  will  this  his- 
torian say  to  tte  fact,  that  when  Coulter's  brigade  of 
East  Tennessee  militia  arrived,  nine  hundred  strong,. 
there  were  reported  in  the  hands  of  these  troops  but 
three  hundred,  and  nxty  stand  of  arms  J  and  those  arms 
in  infamous  order  ? 

This  writer  also  says,  '^though  he  had  a  s^fiBeiency 
of  soldiers  at  the  town  of  Mobile,  and  had  been  appri- 
zed of  the  intentions  of  the  enemy,  previously  to  their 
landiogj  yet  he  delayed  to  send  a  reinforcement  to  Law- 
rence until  the  siege  had  commenced.'' 

TJiis  sii^ciency  of  soldiers  at  the  town  of  Mobile, 
seventeen  hundred  men,  armed  as  before  mentioned, 
must  be  the  ample  force  recorded  by  the  historian — 
wlniich  ample  force  had  to  contend  with  seven  thousand 
fiye  hundred  veteran  soldiers — as  heavy  a  train  of  ar- 
tillery as  the  British  generals  might  have  timught  pro- 
per to  lamV — and,  without  a  single  gun -boat,  to  contend 
Avith  all  t|i©  barges  and  transports  appendant  to  tlie 
British  fleet. — He  also  remarks,  that  I  had  been  ap- 
pi:i2ied  of  the  iutentions  of  the  enemy  previously  to  their 
landiug.  With  due  respect  for  the  province  of  a  his- 
torian., 1  would  ask,  apprized  of  what  intentions  ?  To 
tra,nsport  their  troops  by  way  of  Pass  Heron,  in  barges 
and;  g,un^bcats,  and  effect  a  landing  on  the  west  side  of 
the  bay,  along  which  were  many  sctllements,  as  well 
as  some  herds  of  cattle — which,  ju«]ging  from  previ-, 
ous  events,  I  deemed  no  inconsiderable  allurenicnts  to 


HISTORICAL  DETAILS. 


9» 


British  rapacity— of  apprized  of  their  intention  to  in- 
vest  Fort  Bovvyer  by  land  and  water?  But,  suppose 
they  had  intended  to  effect  a  landing  at  Pascagoltt> 
which  is  but  thisty-six  miles  from  Mobile  by  land,  lit- 
tle better  than  one  day's  march,  what  could  this  writer 
have  done  ?  Probably,  as  a  military  man,  circumstan- 
ced as  I  was,  he  would  have  awaited  an  actual  landing^ 
in  order  to  make  the  best  of  his  force. 

But  I  will  now  advisp  him,  that  he  must  have  labor- 
ed  under  a  total  privation  of  all  authentic  intelligence, 
as  to  the  previous  plan  of  defence.  Some  time  anterior 
to  the  landing  of  the  British  troops,  and  their  investi- 
ture of  the  fort,  it  .d  been  concerted  between  colonel . 
Lawrence^and  myself,  that  in  such  events,  a  strong  de- 
tachment should  cross  the  bay  and  act  upon  the  rear  of 
the  besieging  army.  Here  follows  the  first  intelligence 
of  those  events.  The  following  letter  is  dated  "Fort 
Bowyer,  ©th  Februarys  1815." 

a  Sir— -Immediately  after  captain  Ghamberlain  left 
this  yesterday,  the  enemy  made  a  division  of  his  fleet-^ 
ten  ships  and  three  brigs  have  taken  a  position  about 
four  miles  below  the  fort— the  residue  remain  on  our 
front,  near  Pelican  Island.   Eighteen  or  twenty  bargea 
were  employed  in  debarking  troops  on  Dauphine  Isl- 
and, immediately  opposite  the  fort— a  numbef  of  fiie« 
were  kindled  and  continued  to  burn  during  the  night. 
This  morning  early,  a  debarkation  commenced  from  the 
rear  division.     Eighteen  or  twenty  barges  have  been 
running,  and  I  feel  certain,  from  the  number  of  vessels, 
we  must  calculate  on  a  v&ry  superior  force.    Major 
Blue,  mi\i  one  thousand  or  fifteen  hundred  men,  to  fall 
on  the  rear  of  the  eneny,.  would  &moy  him  Much,,  ami 


;/•■ 


I 


0a 


HISTORICAL  DETAILS. 


II' 


render  the  greatest  assistance  that  coulil  be  given  U8 — 
more  than  that  number,  if  they  could  be  spared,  would 
be  better.  It  is  evident  an  attack  is  contemplated  on 
this  fortress.  We  can  defend  the  works,  but  our  num- 
ber is  too  ftw  to  admit  of  a  division. 

"  From  the  conduct,  both  of  the  oflRcers  and  men,  I 
fee;l.  myself  warranted  in  saying  the  enemy  will  neet  a 
warm  reception,  and  w^U  have  nurthing  to  bor^i  of,  let 
the  result  be  what  it  m  y.  We  feel  conftflent  of  suc- 
cess, should  we  not  be  overpoweretl  by  numbers. 
"  I  am,  with  respect,  your  obU^t.  serv't. 

"  WILLIAM  LAWRENCE, 
«Lt  Vol.  U  In.  Com.il' g:' 

The  above  communication  did  not  reach  me  until  one 
o'clock,  on  the  morning  of  the  lOlh  of  February.  A 
detail  of  one  thousand  one  hundred  men,  under  the  com- 
inapd  of  an  able  and  experienced  officer,  major  Blue  of 
the  39th  infantry,  was  immediately  ordered  to  embark 
far  Bon-Sccours,  to  raise  the  apprehended  siege.  For 
the  transportation  of  this  command,  all  the  boats  which 
had  been  held  in  requisition,  and  all  the  private  vessels 
in  the  harbor,  with  their  sailors,  were  employed.  Ow- 
ing to  adverse  winds,  the  expedition  could  not  possibly 
move,  until  the  evening  of  the  10th;  but  on  the  advance 
of  this  detachment,  after  effecting  a  landing  at  Bon- 
Secours,  intelligence  was  received  by  major  Blue,  that 
the  operations  of  the  British,  5000  strong,  had  been 
successful ;  and  that  the  garrison  had  capitulated. 

In  addition  to  the  foregoing  exposition,  it  will  be  re- 
collected, that  there  is  but  one  ehh  and  one /oo(?  tide  in 
the  b{iy  o.  Mobile  in  twenty-four  hours.  This  arrange, 
pient  of  uiituie,  thejcfore,  put  it  ia  the  powey  of  the 


'\ 


HISTORICAL  DETAlLii 


•A 


British  commanders  to  appear  before  the  town  with 
their  transports  in  twelve  hours,  by  taking  advantogc 
of  the  flood,  without  much  regard  to  the  coiirst  of  the 
winds.  Thus  was  I  placed  between  triple  duties,  wiih 
an  overwhelming  force  of  i^OO  men.  exclusive  of  the 
garrison  at  Fort  Bowyer,  destitute  of  naval  co-operation, 
and  even  possessing  but  few  means  of  transportation, 
to  operate  against  an  onset  of  a  heavy  naval  armament 
and  7300  veteran  troops. 

Authentic  historians  I  have  always  considered  to  be 
the  depositories  of  national  honor,  as  well  as  tViC  guar- 
aians  of  individual  reputation  ;  as  well  the  fiagellators 
of  national  infamy,  as  the  inflexible  adherents  to  trut^i, 
with  regard  to  individuals.     It  has  been  asserted,  and 
perhaps  with  some  truth,  reasoning  from  the  conduct 
of  ancient  historians,  that  their  prejudices,  whilst  the 
objects  of  their  historical  investigations  were  contempo- 
rary, were  too  strong  for  the  operations  of  the  homan 
understanding— too  strong  foi   human  integrity ;  and 
that  thv^.  histories  of  nations  and  individuals  ought  not 
to  be  written,  until  the  operations  of  time  can  have  ex- 
tinguished those  prejudices  which  result  from  personal 
friendship,  and  personal  enmity.     With  deference  to 
all  such  authorities,  I  am  constrained  to  dissent  from 
them.     No  man  will  pretend  to  assert,  that  an  object 
can  bo  as  distinctly  seen,  through  the  vista  of  a  thou- 
sand years,  as  if  present :  no  man  will  pretend  to  as- 
sert, that  he  can  see  an  object  as  distinctly  at  the  dis- 
tance of  one  thousand  miles,  as  if  placed  within  a  few 
fept  of  his  organs  of  vision.    Let,  then,  the  histories  of 
individuals  and  nations  be  written  while  the  objects  are 
alive,  who  cm  cofltradict  mis-statements.      We  have 


et 


KlSTORICAL  DBTAILB. 


iiistories  of  XUmHj  wi''tten  long  after  her  birth.  Were 
Bo«Mhi8  and  Remus  raised  by  a  she  wolf?  One  of 
these  gcntlcmcR  is  said  by  "  hwtorians"  to  ht  the  foun* 
der  of  the  Roman  •mpire.  How  different  would  have 
|»een  the  history  of  the  origin  of  that  emph-e,  had  jus- 
lice  been  done  to  the  baiiditii  who  gafo  her  Hi?  th  I 
Ttierefore,  let  all  histories  be  written  withiu  p^ri- 
ods  in  which  romances  can  be  proven  'jutrue.  What 
would  have  been  the  fate  of  my  military  character,  hatl 
my  grey  hairs  descended  to  tlie  grave,  and  the  docu- 
ments faithfully  laid  before  my  country  been  permitted 
to  moulder,  i^^^for*"  the  "  History  of  the  Late  War  in 
the  Western  Country"  had  been  written  ! 

J.  W. 

^ennessee-^ngustf  I8I7. 


\-' 


BniTT3H. 

22  pieces  of  artillery,  from 
e  to  l«-poun(ler8,  Home  large 
]iM>rtars  inclusive,  within  3  i 
miles  in  rear  of  the  fort. 

S006  men,  within  3  i  mile* 
of  the  rear,  covered  by  sand- 
•bankfl. 

2900  on  Daiiphine  Island, 
under  general  Keane,  3  i  miles 
distant — with  barges  and  gun^ 
boats,  and  a  fleet  of  nioie  than 
538  nail  at  aocher. 


AM^BIOAM* 


300  men,  garrison  in  Fort 
Bowyef  under  colonel  Lavr- 
rence,  asmany  as  could  act  cPi* 
ciently  within  its  ramparti. 


mmm 


»■      li._Ji»M 


B 


APPENDIX. 


ID 


fA.J 

GEJ^EIUL  HJRRISOA: 

(copy.', 
«  lieai'fluarterai  Fort!  Wayw,  19<ft  Sepl»nber,  18 J2. 

*<  The  Pretirfent  of  tht  United  States  having  detiigiiated  btl- 
g&dfer  i^eral  James  Winc'iestec  to  the  coaimand  of  the  ttrray 
originally  dftitined  to  relieve  general  Hull,  au^  that  officer  hav- 
ing arrived  at  this  plaee,  titv  command  is  accordingly  relinqiiislt- 
ed  to  him. 

"Brigadier  general  Pay;.  ,  colonel  Wells,  and  captain  Garrard, 
commanding  the  &everal  corps  of  the  army,  wi'l  accordingly  re- 
port theAiselves  to  general  Winchester,  and  receive  his  orders. 
If  any  thing  could  soften  the  regret  whic  >  the  general  feels  at 
parting  with  troops,  which  Imve  so  entirely  won  his  confidence 
and  affection,  it  is  the  circumstance  of  his  zommitting  them  to  the 
cfiarge  of  one  qf  the  herces  of  our  glorious  revolution.  .61  man 
distinguished  as  well  for  the  services  lie  has  rendered  his  countri/y 
OS  for  tlie  possession  of  every  qualification  which  constitutes  the 
gentleman.  The  general  can-^ot  take  leave  of  this  gallant  army, 
which  he  has  commanded  with  so  much  satisfaction,  withouC  ex- 
prefMing  the  high  sense  which  he  entertains  of  their  conduct. 

"  For  ten  duys  past,  they  have  performed  severe  daiy  icithout 
scarce  a  iufficiency  of  food  to  sustain  (Aem,  and  entirely  wiihout 
some  of  the.  articles  which  constilute  the  ■'ation. 

"They  ha>ve  done  it,  too,  without  a  murmur,  and  with  ala- 
crity, which  could  only  have  bee'-  expeeted  fram  vuteraa  troops. 
The  general  requests  brigadier  general  Payne,  and  every  officer 
And  soldier  in  the  army,  to  »ccept  his  thaitka,  for  the  support; 
they  have  given  him  upon  every  occasion,  and  fur  tiie  jiromptJ- 
tude  and  aJaerity  with  wbieh  \m  orders  have  b«ea  obeyed! — bf 


k 
tr 


-A 


"  .--*^'T,l^--ir-  ■?* 


■^mmmmemm^^ma:!^-^ 


m 


APPENDIX. 


has  nndertakcn  to  communicate  to  the  governor  of  Kentucky^ 
and  through  him  to  the  people  of  that  state,  hi«  opinion  of  their 
distinguished  merits,  and  hi»  entire  confidence  in  their  perseve, 
ranee  in  the  paths  of  glory  and  patriotism. 

The  'eneral  feeU  equal  pride  and  pleasure,  m  acknowledging 
the  pe«"onal  attachment  which  the  army  has  manifested  toward* 
Lim !  and  he  assures  Ihem,  that  their  welfare  and  glory  is  the 
first  object  of  his  wishes-and  as  a  means  of  securing  hoth,  Ae 
most  heartily  recommends,  and  entreats,  that  the  confidence  they 
have  so  often  expressed  in  him,  may  b,  transferred  to  hxs  worthy 

^""'AsTovernor  and  comma"der  in  chief  of  the  Indiana  terri- 
tory, the  general  assumes  the  command  of  the  troops  in  that  ter- 
ritory,  by  virtue  of  n  authority  received  from  the  honorable  the 
secretary  at  war ;  and,  as  a  major  general  of  the  Kentucky  quota, 
h^  take?  the  command  of  all  the  troops  of  that  state,  north  of 
*he  Ohio,  excepting  the  army  of  ge<.eral  Winchester. 

Si-ned)  "  NATHANIEL  F.  ADAMS 

^    °  <=  Deputy  Mj.  Gen." 


Fxtrad  from  a  communication,  under  date  the  2m  of  October 
1815,  from  the  late  governor  ^f  Ke     My,  the  justly  U^ented 
.     GlrJe  mdison-together  with  such  ecctracts  from  his  affida- 
vit, «s  are  considered  material  to  an  elucidation  of  my  military 
conduct  at  the  north-west.  .       •  <i.^ 

«  Some  men  are  fortunate  and  become  popular,  who  ai  the 
same  time  arc  not  so  deserving,  as  those  who  from  their  exer- 
Zl  and  strict  attention  to  the  interests  of  their  «oun^y,  becom 
obnoxious  ;  but  it  is  only  to  those  whose  inte.  .sts  clash.     1  hey 
tZav  agitate  something  (and  without  foundation  too)  w^^^^^^ 

rou  s  th'e  people,  who  frequently  go  to  very  unbounded  and  un- 
Inerou  len.4hs.  In  such  cases,  it  is  best  in  my  opinion  to  have 
Si  nce--Tet  heir  prejadices  subside;  then,  if  a  man  thu.ks 
r  or  0  satisfy  the  pubUe,  as  to  the  injustice  which  has  been 
rr  i   clc  er  b/ihcmaUgnanL  it  may  Ue  wcU  enough  tod. 


APPENDIX. 


63 


«0.  Whsn  a  man's  conscience  is  clear,  and  he  feels  complete 
self-approbalion  as  to  the  rectitude  of  his  conduct,  it  is  certainly 
f.  great  comfort  to  him  in  retirement  from  public  life  -  much 
greater  than  to  have  the  popular  clamor  in  his  favor,  without 
this  rectitude  of  conscience,  which  I  am  sure  you  possess. 

(Signed  **  GEORGE  MADISON. 

i^  Frankfort,'*  ^c.  Sfe. 

MOST  MATEMAL  EXTRACTS  FftOM  THE  AFFIDAVIT. 

ft  Affidavit  of  George  ladison.  Frankfort,  Kentucky:^ 
«  At  the  time  general  Winchester  assumed  the  command  of  the 
north-western  army,  he  was  very  unpopular  with  thd  volunteers 
from  Kentucky ;  so  much  so,  that  general  William  H  Harrison, 
on  resigning  the  command,  harangued  the  oflleera  at  length,  and 
very  impressively,  requesting  them  to  reconcile  their  meu  to  ge- 
neral Wiuchester,  stating  that  he  considered  him  a  good  officer 
tind  a  worthy  man.  [See  again  the  statements  of  captain  Hop- 
Jcins,  colonel  Barbee,  major  Eve,  and  captain  Eastland,  as  to 
tow  far  general  Harrison  acted  in  conformity  with  this  advice 
to  the  offieers.J  I  knew  of  no  intrigue  or  corabioation  among 
the  offiears  at  this  time  to  render  general  Winchester  unpopular 
with  the  arrav,  or  to  deprive  him  of  the  command ;  but  in  the 
month  of  December,  1813,  when  returning  from  St.  Mary's  to 
Defiance,  I  heard  it  mentioned  by  the  officers  of  Jennings's  re- 
giment, tJiat  general  Harrison  had  carried  on  sams  underhand 
business  f  to  get  the  command  of  the  army  from  general  Winchester. 
[See  again  general  Harrison's  salatary  advice  to  the  officers,  oa 
resigning  the  command— also  his  farewell  address  to  the  army-l 
"  I  believe  the  army  on  its  marcl  *  at  Fort  Wayne  to  Defi- 
ance, under  tU  direction  of  general  -nehester,  w  as  conducted 
wilh  the  utm<*t  care,  skill  and  caution.*    Whilst  it  continued 


•  Even  this  conduct  was  misrepresented.  The  following  is  a  quotation 
from  a  communication,  under  dute  the  22d  of  October,  1812,  from  captaii*. 
Thomas  Eastland : 

"  Could  you  have  thought  that  any  part  of  your  conduct,  on  the  maroh 
from  Fort  AVayne  to  DeHanc^,  would  have  draw^  down  on  you  theunmer-, 
it'**  (;liM-Ke  Qf  CPWitrcUce  f  You  wiU  »ay,  no  i  b«,t,  str,  i^,  i3  neyeilh(:ie9s,a  . 


*   I 


^««r». ■'••'«■ 


m 


APPENBIX. 


near  Defiance,  aiiJ  during  the  time  the  fort  was  hiiiWing,  t 
thought  general  Winchester  vigilant,  alert,  and  attentive  t*  his 
duty— and  I  discovered  no  remissness  nor  relwatioa  from  his  du- 
ly at  any  time.  . 

«  Some  time  between  the  8th  and  12th  of  January,  we  arrived 
at  the  Rapids  of  the  Miami,  where  a  co-operation  was  expected 
with  general  Tupper—but  in  that  we  were  diftappointed.    In  a 
few  days  after  our  arrival  at  the  Rapids,  1  understood  that  ge- 
neral Wiochestei^  had  received  eotnmnnications  from  the  inhabi- 
tants of  the  Au  Haisin  settlement,  making  af  plication  to  him 
•for  assistance  and  protection— which  was  repeated,  with  State- 
ments that  the  enemy  were  plundering  them  of  their  property. 
A  council  of  the  officers  was  then  called,  and  their  opinions  ti- 
ken.    To  the  best  of  my  recollection,  they  were  nnanimously  of 
opinion,  that  a  detachment  ought  to  be  sent  to  the  relief  of  the 
inhabitants  at  Raisin,  as  soeti  as  practicable. 

fact.    You  will  ask  me,  who  could  h»ve  originated  such  a  charge  ?  I  a^s^ver, 
your  enemies— men  high  in  rank  !  and  their  unprincipled  minions  :— they 
are  those,  sir,  who  will  endeavour  to  induce  you  to  accredit  them  as  friends, 
and  Who  are  only  awaiting  an  opportunity  to  mflict  a  wound,  intended  as  a 
death  blow  to  your  character  as  i  soldier  and  a  citizen.    Yoil  may  ask  me, 
Tivhy  it  should  be  the  wish  of  any  subaltern  in  the  army,  or  of  any  individual 
ill  this  countr)',  to  desire  your  disgrace  ?  I  answer,  because  you  are  not  the 
.  man  who  will  suit  dieir  purposes— they  are  aware  that  a  sense  of  duty  will 
eternally  prevent' youv  [?oing  hand  in  hand  with  mendicants  for  popularity, 
and  engaging  in  seer,   .  of  intrigue  and  sycophancy,  for  a  momentary  buzz, 
of  reputation'.     What,  you  will  say,  is  it  possible  that  I  have  to   contend 
igainst  internal  as  well  as  external  foes  !— There  exists  no  doubt  of  it  in  ro> 
mind,  arid  were  it  not  too  tedious  to  state  the  reasons  for  my  belief  in  a  let- 
ter, I  would  give  you  a  full  history  of  the  various  plans  and  intrigues,  that 
are  intended  to  be  put  in  operation,  if  all  u.i!'.gs  go  well.    One  great  object, 
•is  to  put  you  down,  and  every  other  man,  from  whom  the  party  apprehends 
resistance  or  detection.    They  watch  your  conduct,  with  an  hawk's  eye, 
nnd'ihe  smallest  spet  k  is  to  be  swelled  into  a  mountain.     Cidti-ate  the  con- 
fidence of  Madison,  ,  Davenport,  Graves,  Lc\.is,  Gano  and  Allen; 

they  arc  men  of  integrity,  and  disposed  to  be  your  fncnds.  Colonel  Bar- 
bee  and  major  Palmer,  although  not  personally  acquainted  with  you,  arc 
friendly  to  you.  These  are  the  men  who  broke  up  the  intrioae,  \(hich  was 
on  foot  at  St.  Mary's,  to  wrest  from  you  the  command  of  the  army,  previ- 
ously to  die  aiTival  of  the  major  general's  commission."  [For  an  ample 
exposition  of  the  circumstances  alluded  to  in  the  ubove  quotation,  see  cap- 
tniu  Eastland'*  last  lettci',  dated  July,  1317.] 


APPENDIX. 


^ 


«  ;t  understood,  that  several  Winebester  was  with  «»e  troop* 
aooa  after  the  action  coinme»eedt-and  that  he  used  every  exer- 
tion  to  rally  the  troops  whieJi  retreated^aod  that  d.ir.n?  the 
whole  time,  or  until  he  was  made  prisoner,  he  behaved  himselt 
HI  a  manner  becoming  his  rank  as  an  officer. 

"I  cannot  say.  whether  or  not  general  Winchester  bad  any 
ri-ht  to  expect  rciuforeeinents  from  generals  Tapper  and  Pi:r^ 
kins ;  but  it  was  generally  believed  that  we  would  receive  troops 
from  them.  lam  well  persuaded,  that  could  we  have  been  rem- 
P>rc<fd  with  five  hundred  additional  raen,  a  victory  on  thb 

«2D   OF  JANUARY,  1813,  WOULD    HAVIi    BREN    THE   RESULT,   IN- 
STEAD OF  A  DEFEAT.  i     *  1 

« 1  further  slate,  that  the  army  under  the  corc-naud  of  general 
Winchester,  in  its  whole  liue  by  Fort  Wayne  to  Deuance,  wa» 
much  exposed  to  the  incursions  of  the  enemy— that  its  duties 
were  unavoidably  severe  and  fatiguing,  owing  to  the  outinual 
eommands,  scouts,  &e.  &e.  which  it  had  to  furni8h~-od  that 
the  greater  part  of  the  timeii  was  very  badly  supplied  with  pro- 
visions, and  had  uq  forage  furnished-w\u\e  the  centre  anA  nght 
wings,  from  report  and  information,  ircre  we«  supplied  with  bot^. 
these  articles,  and  not  so  much  exposed  to  the  enemy, 

(Signed)  "GEORGE  MADISON." 


\ 


r 


15XTRACT  FROM  COLONEL  BARBEE's  STATEMENT. 

«  Danville,  Ken.  Sth  July^  1814. 

"DEARSitt—  ...  , 

"  In  the  latter  part  of  September,  1812,  whilst  encamped 
^ith  my  regiment  at  Piqua,  I  received  a  message  from  gen- al 
Harrison,  then  at  St  Mary's,  requesting  that  I  would  the  ne  it 
day  call  on  him.  On  the  evening  of  the  23d  I  reacheci  his  qu.-r- 
ters— and  in  a  few  minutes  was  introduced,  never  bef. re  huving 
seen  him.  In  a  short  time  we  were  left  alone,  and  tSo  subject 
of  his  tour  to  Fort  Wayne  was  introduced.  He  stated  to  me, 
that  a  good  understatiding  did  not  exist  beewoen  general  Win- 
ahestev  and  ftiiiisei/— that  Winchester  had  not  treated  him  like 


68 


APPENDIX. 


I 


'\: 


a  j»entleman^ — that  on  arriving  at  the  head  of  tbe  line,  somedifff. 
cuhy  arose  as  to  whieh  were  to  have  the  command — that  it  was 
ftgried,  each  should  submit  to  the  other  his  authority  and  in- 
structions—that  he  (general  Harrison)  handed  to  Winchester 
his  credsutials,  which  were  examined  and  returned  without  an 
observation.     G-eneral  Harrison  then  went  on  to  state  how  un- 
popalar  Winchester  was  with  the  army  in  advance,  &c.    Colonel 
Jennings  then  coming  up,  the  general  and  colonel  stepped  a  few 
paces  aside,  and  eonversed.    I  was  called  up,  and  then  the  subject 
ofth  field  officers^  signing  a  paper,  sanctioning  general  Harri  Jon 
as  tfieit  commanding  officer,  was  introduced.    Either  the  gene- 
rat  or  colonel  held  the  paper-,  I  am  not  certain  which.    The  ge- 
neral  spike  of  the  necessity  of  something  being  done — that  himself 
and  general  Winchester  were  both  with  the  army,  and  who  should 
command  was  the  question.    [See  again  general  Harrison^s  fare- 
well address  to  the  army.J    1  answered,  that  if  there  were  a  dis- 
pute between  them,  it  was  not  for  us  to  decide — and  positively 
refuspd  to  sign  the  paper.    Very  little  more  on  that  subject  pas- 
sed at  that  time-     A  few  days  after,  general  Harrison  received 
hifr  commission  from  the  secretary  of  war.    I  was  afterwards 
told,  that  the  object  of  my  being  called  to  St.  Mary^s  that  day, 
was  for  tlie  express  purpose  of  joining  colonels  Jennings  and 
Payne,  and  the  other  field  officers  of  their  regiments,  in  signing 
I  paper  acknowledging  general  Harrison  our  commanding  gene- 
ral.   I  have  but  little  doubt,  thrt  it  was  the  fuved  and  settled 
purpose  of  the  general,  both  before  and  after  the  project  of  this 
iustrument  of  writini^,  to  ruin  general  Winchester,  and  supplant 
him  in  the  command  and  affections  of  the  army.    This  impression 
I  am  induced  to  entertain,  both  from  what  he  said  to  me  at  St. 
M  rj's,  and  from  a  great  number  of  little  circumstances,  too 
many  for  detail  at  present— but  which  I  think  can  be  proven  by 
captains  Eve,  Quarles  and  Garrard,  all  of  whom  were  then  in 
colonel  JeDDtngs's  regiment. 

(Signed)  «  JOSHUA  BAKBEl^! 


(, 


i 


APPENDBi. 


« 


EMract  of  a  tetter  from  captain  TFilliam  Garrard,  dated  Paris, 

Ken.  Oct.  ±5thf  18141. 
"Dear  General-- 

"  I  saw  ray  brother,  captain  Daniel  Ganrartl,  who  belonged 
to  colonel  Jenning'^'a  regiment,  and  conversed  with  him  on  the 
subject  of  an  address  drawn  up  by  the  oflicers  of  that  regiment, 
the  object  of  which  was  ta  place  ge-neral  Harrison  in  the  chief 
command  of  the  north-western  army,  at  the  time  you  were  de- 
signated by  government  to  that  station.     He  informs  me  that 
major  Eve,  one  of  the  field  ofl&cers  of  the  regiment,  and  Samuel 
M'Kee,  esq.  member  of  congress,  can  give  more  information  on 
the  first  moving  cause,  and  progress  of  that  subject,  than  he  can, 
as  he  was  never  privately  consulted  on  the  subject,  and  knew 
iiotliing  of  his  own  knowledge  of  the  scheme,  until  it  was  intro- 
duced in  a  meeting  of  tl^e  officers  of  his  regiment,  when  he  w»- 
the  first  person  who,  in  the  most  prompt,  pointed,  and  indignant 
manner,  objected  to  the  measure,  as  subversive  of  every  principle 
of  military  duty  and  subordination — and  that  he  never  afterwards 
was  advised  with  or  consulted  on  the  subject.     He  further  in- 
formed me,  that  he  should  see  major  Eve  in  a  few  days,  and 
procure  his  affidivit  in  relation  to  this  transaction.— As  to  ray- 
self,  I  personally  know  nothing  of  the  practices  used  to  super.- 
sede  you,  as  I  had  at  a  very  early  period  indicated  my  opinions 
very  freely  and  fully  on  all  occasions,  which  were  known  to  he 
adverse  to  superseding  the  officer  designated  by  the  government  to 
the  command,  and  of  course  I  was  not  such  d  person  as  ivould  be 
advised  with  and  consulted  on  that  subject. 

"  I  am,  dear  sir.  with  sincere  respect, 

*'  Your  most  obedient  servant, 

«  WILL.  GARRARD,  JaJ* 


EXTRACTS  FROM  GENERAL  GANG'S  AFFIDAVIT. 

(copy.) 
At  the  request  of  brigadier  general  James  Winchester,  the  f»»I- 
lo^'ing  afti(k,%vit  of  major  Richard  M.  Gano,  of  the  ist  regiment 


yQ 


APPENDIX. 


"  of  general  Payne's  brigade  of  Kentucky  volunteer  militia,  in  the 
gerviee  of  the  Jnited  States,  from  the  14th  August,  1812,  for 
six  months,  is  submitted : — 

«  The  aboveraentioned  brigade  marched  from  Georgetown, 
Kentucky,  on  the  day  above  stated,  under  the  command  afore- 
said, for  Cincinnati,  where  general  Harrison  took  the  command, 
under  whom  we  proceeded  to  Port  Wayne-from.  whepce  1  was 
ordered  on  a  detachment  to  the  Elk  HartTowhs. 

"On  my  return  to  Fort  Wayne,  I  understood  that  general 
Winchester  had  arrived  there,  and  was  to  take  the  command'. 
A  <'cneral  disaffection  was  manifested,  by  both  officers  and  men. 
General  Harrison,  in  taking  leave  of  the  command,  spoke  ,n  fa- 
vourablo  terms  of  general  Winchester.  vv:„.j,p,fer 

«0a  leaving  Fort  Wayne  for  Defiance,  general  W.ne!  ester 
experienced   some  difficulty,   owing  to   his  orders   not  be.n^ 
promptly  executed,  but  which  was  surmounted  much  to  h.9  ^red- 
it-and  evidently  proved  that  his  objeet  was  the  good  of  his 
country.    The  march  was  conducted  by  general  Winchester  w.th 
caution  and  military  skill.     He  was  industrio...,  and  extrem.-  y 
attentive  to  every  department-and  no  man  who  is  acquainted 
with  him,  can  deny  his  firmness.    On  our  approaching  ^v^^^^e, 
h    alngement  evidently  displayed  much  skill--and  whiUt  at 
defiance,  the  general  was  vigilant  and  enterprising ;  and  from 
Ws  niee  attention  to- police  duty,  the  army  w.s  .luch  advanta- 
Zl    Some  discontent  preveiled  in  camp,  omng  to  the  scarcty 
%  supplies,  which  tve  had  received  assurances  should  he  forwar- 
Id  ,L  we  were  .o,me  days  without  rations,  exclusive  of  a  smalt. 

^twhUsttf Defiance,  a  great  anxiety  toproceed  to  the  Rapids 
existed,  but,  as  t  understood  from  general  Winchester,  we  cou  d 
no   proceed  until  we  had  so  many  days'  provisions  on  hand; 
who'^further  informed  me,  that  our  advance  at  that  time  was  no 
Cured  by  general  Harrison.    Ouing  to  the  scarcity  of  .vood 
&c  we  remov.  1  across  the  Miami,  where  we  remained  some 
terduring  v.-hieh  we  were  employed  constantly  in  bu.  ding 
boat  ,  aud  preparing  to  descend  the  river  as  soon  as  ^^^o^ 
receive  sa/uii -s  and  orders  from  general  Harrison.     The  river 
V  oze,  and    -ts  were  of  no  use     We  received  orders,  as  I  un- 
iers    od  /r  .. ; ' W«/  Uarrson,  to  advance  to  the  Bapids,  where 


APPENDIX. 


7i 


we  mm  f^  U joined  hy  gMttnl  tapper  and  the  Hght  wing.  Bv 
*ry  exenion  was  made  to  advance  the  baggage  on  sleds,  mrty 
<it  \vhich  were  drawn  by  the  troops,  aad  they  withoot  provisbns, 
through  a  deep  snow.  • 

"The  general  atixifety  t6  reach  the  Rapids^  was  M  doabt 
ihuflh  increased,  froih  an  expectatidn  of  meeting  supplies;  but 
on  oar  arrival,  #e  were  disappointed.  For  some  days  we  sab- 
risted  upon  corn  principally.  Which  we  gathered  from  the  fields. 
fHefe  follows  the  sil'jstance  «f  Ivhat  I  have  already  stated^  M 
to  the  sftlicitations  to  advance  for  the  protection  of  Frenchtowa, 
&c.  ^hieli  it  is  needless  to  recapitulate— General  Gano  thus 
concludes.]  On  my  return  from  the  Rapids  to  Fort  M' Arthur, 
I  found  it  wfeU  stfpplied,  and  understood  they  had  not  wanted 
provisions  in  the  right  wing;  however,  it  was  almost  impossible 
for  sup   '  .» to  have  reached  us  by  that  ro  ata.owing  to  the  swamp* 

Uid  bad  roads. 

(Signed)  "R.M.GANO." 


EXTRACT  FROM  MAJOR  EVE'S  STATEMENT,  ON 

OATH. 

«  A  few  days  after  general  Winchester  had  assumed  the  com- 
mand at  Fort  Wayne,  we  were  met  at  the  St.  Mary's  by  general 
Harrison,  who  caHed  all  the  field  officers  together  who  were  at 
that  place,  together  with  the  hon.  Samuel  M'Kee.    General 
Harrison  then  stated,  that  the  army  was  in  a  deplorable  situa- 
:tion— that  he  bad  relinquished  the  command  to  general  Win- 
chester ;  but,  from  a  letter  which  had  met  him  at  St.  Mary  s, 
he  was  at  a  loss  to  understand  whether  the  secretary  of  war  in- 
-tended  that  he,  Harrison,  or  Winchester  should  have  the  com- 
mand—that the  troops  at  Fort  Wayne  were  much  dissatisfied  at 
teing  commanded  by  general  Winchester,  and  that  he  had  to 
take  some  pains  to  satisfy  them.    He  then  requested  the  officers 
jiresant,  to  smj  who  they,  and  the  troops  under  their  respective  com- 
tnands,  would  rather  be  commanded  by. .  The  answer,  to  a  man, 
was,  that  they  had  rather  be  commanded  by  general  Harrison. 
Bethtn  requested  the  officers  to  make  that  expression  in  writing'^ 


1 


4  --¥ 


n 


APPENDIX. 


^nd  called  on  Mr.  •V'A'ee  to  draw  a  loritten  statement  to  that 
eWect,  oBSKUviNO  at  the  same  jimb,  that  he  would  send 
,T  -^o  THE  oESicEKs  AT  FoRT  WAVNE—and  ij  it  was  the  wish 
of  the  army  generally  that  he  should  command,  XT'  ue  would 

TAKE  IT,  AND  RISK  THE  OONSEqUENCES  WITH  THE  GOVERN- 
MENT,* B«t,  upon  reaectiou,  aiter  general  Harmon  had  re* 
tired,  it  was  thought  improper  by  the  officers  to  sign  the  state- 
ment  drawn  up  by  Mr,  M'jCee.  General  Harrison  was,  in  a  few 
days  afterwards,  invested  with  the  command  by  the  secretary  of 
war,  which  made  any  further  call  on  the  officers  unnecessary. 
I  have  only  to  state  facts,  without  intending  to  eulogize  general 
Winchester,  or  to  injure  general  Harrison,  With  the  former  I 
liave  very  little  acquaintance;  but  have  no  hesitaUcn  in  saying, 
that  I  believe  his  conduct  whiLi  in  the  army  has  been  much  mis-, 
represented  to  his  prejudice, . 

.     "  Yours,  sincerely,  ** 

^4.    .  "JOSEPH  EVE. 

*  Barbourville,  23d  Nov.  1814. 
I  A  «  To  Col.  D.  Garrard." 


«en, 


re.  J 

copy  OF  THE  AFFIDAVIT  OP  CAPTAIN  WILLIAM 

GARRARD. 

"The  affidavit  of  William  Garrard  jun.  late  captain  of  a 
^roop  of  volunteer  light  dragoons,  in  the  service  of  the  United 
States  for  12  mouths— states,  That  his  corps  was  attached  to 
the  detachment  of  Kentucky  troops  originally  destined  for  the 
relief  of  general  Hull's  army  at  Detroit;  that  after  the  rendez- 
vous of  the  detachment  at  Newport,  and  the  intelligence  of  Huils 
surrender,  general  Harrison  took  the  command  of  t  lem,  and 
directed  their  march  to  Fort  Wayne,  which  was  reported  to  be 
invested  by  the  savages,  and  in  great  danger  of  falling  into  the.r 
hands.  This  deponent,  with  his  corps,  marched  wiUi  the  de^ 
tachment  to  Fort  Wayne,  and  from  thence  on  a  short  cxpedllion 

•  WhAt  is  the  true  s-gnification  of  \ he  word  mutiny  ? 


.m-^v% 


4  --m 


APPENDIX. 


73 


to  the  forks  of  the  Wabash,  and  on  their  return,  or  very  soon 
afterwards,  brigadier  general  Winchester  arrived  at  Fort 
Wayne,  and  general  Harrison  announced  in  a  general  order  to 
the  troops,  that  general  Winchester  would,  by  orders  from  the 
department  of  ^var,  assume  the  command  of  the  detachment,  who 
were  to  march  to  Old  Fort  Defiance,  from  Fort  Wayne. 

«  This  deponent  has  no  hesitation  in  declaring,  that  general 
Winchester  conducted  the  line  of  march  ably  and  jur^iciously, 
arranging  the  line  of  march  so  as  to  aflFord  the  greatest  facility 
in  their  formation,  to  «vt  either  offensively  or  defensively,  as 
eircumstances   might   require.      At  the    same   time  guarding 
against  the  possibility  of  surprise  during  t^e  day,  by  tho  em- 
ployment  of  videttes,  parties  of  dragoons,  and  a  company  of  spies, 
disposing  them  in  such  manner  as  to  prevent  the  main  body 
from  beiug  taken  oft"  their  guard  at  any  moment- -and,  to  guard 
a-ainst  night  attacks,  the  ground  of  encampmciit  was  well  cho- 
sen, and  strongly  fortified.    In  short,  this  deponent  thinks  that 
the'  march  was  conduefed,  by  the  general  commanding,  with 
great  skill,  caution  and  judgment.     That  shortly  after  the  arri- 
val of  the  army  at  Defiance,  this  deponent  was  ordered  by  gene- 
ral Winchester  to  the  settlements  of  Ohio,  to  recruit  the  horses 
of  the  troop,  and  never  afterwards  acted  on  th j  left  line ;  that 
whilst  on  the  right  line,  his  troop  were  well  supplied  with  forage 
and  provisions.    This  deponent,  after  he  left  that  wing  of  the 
army  commanded  by  general  Winchester,  knows  nothing  of  his 
own  knowledge  of  their  sufferings  for  want  of  provisions;  but 
whilst  m  the  right  line,  often  heard  that  such  was  the  fact,  from, 
mthority  that  could  not  be  doubted.     This  deponent  is  well  sa«w- 
fied,  that  the  right  wing  of  the  army  were  well  supplied  with 
provisions  and  forage,  more  particularly  with  the  first.'' 

EXTRACTS  FROM  THE  AFFIDAVIT  OF  JAME^GAR- 
RAKD,  JuN.  Inspector  of  Brigadier  General  Payne's  BH- 
gade  of  Kentucky  Volunteers,  Sfc. 
«  When  general  Winchester  took  command  of  the  army  at 

Fort  Wayne,  the  militia  expressed  much  dissatiafactioA  at  hi* 

A. 


•  ! 
)  i 


;  I 


/   , 


L 


...  i- 


\ 


H' 


^4  APPENDIX. 

being  u  regular  ofTicer;  ftiid,  as  their  partialitieii  were  as  great 
for  general  Harrison,  an  their  prejudices  were  strong  against 
general  Winchester,  there  was  a  great  wish  on  the  part  of  the 
militia  to  be  commandeil  by  general  Harrison—who,  when  he 
Ml  the  army,  addressed  it,. and  informed  u»  he  would  return  to 
St.  Mary^s  and  use  his  utmost  endeavours  to  forward  supplies  to 

JJcjiance" 

•'When  general  Harrison  returned  to  St.  Mary's,  I  have  since 
been  informed,  by  two  officers  of  colonel  Jennings's  regiment 
Kentucky  volunteers,  ibat  he  made  applieation  to  them  to  aiga 
a  petition  to  the  war  department,  recommcndw^  him  to  the  com- 
viand  nf  the  army  then  in  the  north-west "  [Here  the  aflidavit 
goes  OH  to  the  recapitulation  of  what  has  been  already  stated, 
.  relative  to  the  march,  See.  Stc,  and  concludes,! 

«'  General  Winchester  reinforced  us  at  Frencbtown,  I  think 
on  the  30lb  of  Jaimary,  1S13— On  my  return  from  Canada,  I 
passed  the  llapids,  where  general  Harrison  informed  me  that. 

GENKUAL   WlNCHESrEU.IlAD  EVERY  llxiASON    TO  EXPECT  REIN- 

voiicEMENTS  ON  THK  21st;  and.l'urther,  th  AT  thevweue  nis- 

tAYED   IN  consequence  OF   HAVING,  IN. THE  FIRST     INSTANCE, 
■    ATTEMPTED  AN    ADVANCE  ON  THE   ICE,    which    they  WCrC   COm- 

pelled  to  abandon,  return  back,  and  take  Hull's  road.'" 


» 


I 


EXTRACTS  T-ROM  THE  STATEMENT  OF  WILLIAM 
LEWIS,  Colonel  of  the  5tli  Regt.  Kentucky  Volunteers. 
"When  general  Winchester  took  up  the  line  of  march  from 
Fort  Wayne  to  Defiance,!  thought  he  moved  with  as  much  skill 
and  caution  as  a«i  officer  could  have  done,  keeping  spies  out  iu 
the  day,  and  forming  breast-works  every  night." 

"Durinijthe  period  that  the  army  remained  in  quarters  is 
the  vicinity  of  Fort  Defiance,  spies  and  reconnoiU'i  ig  parties 
were  constantly  employed." 

"  Whilst  encampi'd  at  the  Rapids,  general  Winchester  re- 
ceived informatio!i  from  the  settlement  at  llie  r'.ver  Au  Raisin, 
that  the  British  and  Indians  were  pliuKlering  'he  i'i!ihi)itiiiits, 
and  committing  depredation?  upon  their  property.    They  praj  k\ 


I 


% 


■  ^h 


APPENDIX. 


r» 


for  relief,  and  solieited  \m  protection.  He  called  \m  field  olft* 
cers  toi5ether,  and  consulted  them,  as  to  the  propriety  of  this 
movement.  They  were,  I  do  think,  unanimously  o/"  opinion, 
that  a  detachment  should  be.  Sfnt  to  dislodge  the  enemy  on  the  river 
Jlu  Raisin.  This  wa9  on  the  mth  of  January,  and  on  the  ±7th 
a  detachment  under  my  command  marched  for  the  river  ^u  Rai- 
si».  I  And  conbludes  with  this  opinionj— JT  think,  had  the  gene- 
rai^s  force  at  Frenchtown  been  five  hundred  greater  than  it  was, 
he  ivmld  net  have  experienced  a  defeat. — 1  was  iinmedialely  with 
the  general  during  great  pari  of  the  action,  and  caa  bear  testi- 
mony io  his  coolness  and  bravery." 

(Signed)  «  WILLIAM  LEWIS.'2 


"  Defiance,  t^'c.  2i)th  December,  1812* 

«» Sin— 

"  This  winaf  of  the  north-western  arftiy  will  march  tomorrow. 
Its  movements  will  unavoidably  be  tardy,  owing  to  deficiency  as 
to  means  of  transportation  for  its  stores  and  baggage,  for  which 
my  whole  dependence  must  be  on  sleds  to  be  drawn  by  pack- 
horses  and  men— and,  therefore,  no  certain. calculation  can  bo 
made  as  to  the  precise  day  of  my  arrival  at  the  point  of  desti- 
natiouj  but  hope  in  seven  or  eight  dwys  at  farthest.     Oiir  com- 
missary's stores  will  consist  of  about  eigh»  days  rations  of  flour, 
fifteen  barrels  of  salt,  and  seven  hundred  hogs  on  the  hoof.     It 
is  important  that  a  supply  of  flour,  salt  and  liquor,  shall  meet, 
me  at  the  point  ot  destination— of  the  latter,  the  troops  compo- 
sin"  thi?  wing  have  had  very  little  for  more  than  two  months. 
I  shall  leave  the  sick  and  convalescent  at  this  place,  it  being 
fortified,  and  more  comfortable  for  them  than  if  crowded  into  the 
fort.     No  recent  signs  of  Indians  have  lately  been  discovered  in 
this  vicinity^     This  communication  is  committed  to  the  charge 
of  Mr.  Leslie  Combs,  (a  cadet)  who  is  an  intelligent  young  gen- 
Ucman,  in  whom  entire  confidence  may  be  placed— .ani  who  is 


M. 


\ 


7# 


APPENDIX. 


aathorizcd  verbally  to  tjomiuunieate  to  your  excellency,  my  fur. 

therviewi.  ... 

« I  hate  the  honor  to  be, 

«»  Rennect fully,  yoi'f  ob<I(.  nervt. 
"JAM  ;s  WINCHESTER, 

«  Coaidg'  L.  W.  JV.  W.  Arwy 

«  Cf«n.  William  Henry  Harrisorty 
*^  Head-qtutrterst -." 


T 


'!) 


«  Spring  Gardeiif  iith  May,  18lT» 

<  The  lapse  of  several  years  may  have  obliterated  the  un- 
dersigned name  from  yo^r  memory.  Upon  reflection,  it .»  how- 
ever probable  you  will  recognize  it  an  that  r,:  .  a,  who,  in  1812, 
had  the  honor  of  taking  your  orders. 

«  Vou  would  have  been  spared  the  trouble  of  thus  exercising 
,our  recollection,  were  not  a  sense  of  justice,  as  regard,  the  sa- 
ored  faqie  of  a  soldier,  paramount  to  every  other  cons.deraUon 
Juh  ml    I  am  sorry  here  to  be  constrained  to  acknowledge, 
IZ  1  am  one  of  those  nnior.unate  men,  who    h"--"  --' 
,cntly^  aided  in  the  work  of  deceiving  my  country  into  an  .m- 
rope    and  «nwarra.aable  patronage  of  that  wily  and  nnprmc,- 
Jed  intriguer,  the  quondam  general  Harrison.    It  were  .rrele- 
!ant  to  recount  the  circumstances  that  I,  myself,  have  oeen  de- 
ceived,  both  a«  it  regards  the  viows  and  character  of  this  mam 
Let  it  suffice,  that  1  find  some  atonement  for  the  crime,  in  the 
promptness  wi.h  which  1  repelled,  and  attempted  to  expose,  the 
Lt  indications  of  bi«  amliti«n«  intrigues;  and  also  of  havini; 
teen  «ver  after  the  object  of  his  hatred,  malice  and  calumny ;  all 
of  which,  I  assure  y..H.  I  reeeiv|d  with  more  complacency,  than, 
a,  an  honest  man,  I  could  have*  done  his  patronage  or  friend^ 
thip.     From  the  time  he  intrigued  hinself  into  the  famotis  bre- 
ia  commission  of  major  general  at  Frankfort,  1  do  positiv^y 
know  .hat  he  conceived  and  incessantly  labored  to  execu.eaplan 
for  the  destruction  of  your  military  character,  thea  the  only  bar. 


APPENDIX. 


Vf 


tier  between  Mm  and  the  idyl  of  hit  ceaieless  e.:*rticn8— the 
jiiimfind  in  chief  of  the  nt-rth-western  army.     1  know  thw  M 
well  IVom  declaration*  made  by  himself  at  f  be  time,  to  me,  (be- 
ini;  on  the  spot,  and  intimate  with  uimo»t  all  the  actoru  in  that 
flhameful  usurpation  and  abuseof  power)  as  from  his  sub  sequent 
unblushing  indelicacy,  in    attempting  to  alienate— y*«    muti- 
nously  to  alienatA,  the  fonfidenoe  of  the  Kentucky  miliC.atroopa 
from  yciu,  who  was  their  only  legal  commander.     Of  the  circur'- 
stanees  attending  the  first  part  of  this  proposition,  I  am  ready 
And  more  than      lling  to  give  p  full  and  complete  exposition, 
tvhenever  flailed  upon  so  to  do;  for  the  truth  of  the  latter. I  re- 
fer you  to  th'^   hon.  Judge  M'Kee  and  colonel  Barbee,  of  thi» 
state,  men  equall.-  aloof  from  suspicion  us  reproach,  and  who, 
disdaining  the  artifices  of  the  intriguer,  '.voulu    ontribute  their 
utmost  to  expose  him.     Jiidge  M'Kee  resides  '    Madison  coun^ 
ty,  colonel  Barbee  in  Mercer  county.  • 

«  As  I  at  first  observed,  a  sense  of  justr  urged  me  impera- 
tively to  these  disclosures.  Should  they  furnish  a  key  to  unlock 
as  base  a  system  of  intrip^ue  as  ever  disgraced  a  mininn  of  mer- 
cenary prostitution,.  1  am  satisfied.  In  the  interim,  use  my  name 
as  openly  and  publicly  -t  you  please,  I  have  antidotes  at  hand 
for  all  the  poison  of  this  insidious  though  specious  reptile— the 
honor  done  him  by  Ihe  people  of  Ohio,  and  the  recent  white- 
washing by  a  '"ommittee  of  congress,  notwithstanding. 

"  /icccpt,  sir,  the  sympathizing  feelings  of  deference  and  re- 
gard, with  which  the  inj'iries  you  have  sustained  through  the 
machinations  of  intrigue,  and  your  own  excellent  character,  have 
inspired. 

"  Vour  friend  and  obedi.  servant, 

"  S.  G.  HOPKINS, 
■^  "  LatR  Captain  TL  S,  Lt.  Dragoons. 

«•  Genl.  J.  Winchester. ^_ 


.i«*«^S^j_^^ , 


78' 


APPENDIX. 


('  1 


COPIES   OP  LETTERS 

From  Brigadier  GeHcral  Winchester,  when  a  prisoner  of  tvar,io 
the  Secretary  of  War. 

'   '■  .  ■•    r-^ij  '    ■ 

"'M.vLDEN^Jfar.jary  23d,  1813. 
<^  Sir— A  detachment  from  the  left  wing  of  the  nerth-westerii 
army  under  my  command,  at  FrenchtQwn,  on  the  river  Raisin, 
was  attacked  on  the  3al  instant  by  a  force  greatly  superior  in 
number,  aided  by  several  pieces  of  artillery.  The  action  commen- 
ced at  the  dawn  of  day  i  the  picket  guards  were,  driven  in,  and 
a  heitvy  fire  opened  on  the  whole  line,  by  which  a  part  was 
thrown  into  disorder;  and  being  ordered  to  cetire  a  smi^ll  dis- 
tance, in  order  to  form  on  more  advantageous  ground,  I  foun^ 
the  enemy. doubling  our  left  flank  with  for^e  and  rapidity. 

«  A  destructive  fire  was  sustain  d  for  some  t^me;  at  length, 
borne  down  by  numbers,  t"he  few  of  us  who  remained  with  the 
party  that  retired  from  tlie  lines,  submiUed.  Tlie  remainder  of 
our  force,  in  niiipber  about  four  hundred,  continued  to  defend  ■ 
themselves  with  great  gallantiypin  an  unequal  contest  against 
smrill  arms  and  arUllery,  until  I  was  brought  ia  as  a  prisoner 
to  that  pari  of  the  field  occupied  'oy  t!.e  enemy. 

'•  At  this  place,  1  undersf*    J  that  our  troops  were  defending 
"  themselves"  in  a  state  of  ucsperation,  and  was  informed  by  the 
eommauding  officer  of  the  enemy,  that  he  would  atford  them  an 
oj'.portunity  of  surrendering  themselves  prisoners  of  war ;  to 
which  I  acceded.     I  was  the  more  ready  to  make  the  surrender, 
fri>m  being  assurer^;  thnt  unless  done  quickly,  no  responsibility 
would  be  taken  for  the  conduct  of  tho  savages,  who  were  then 
assembled  in  great  numbers.     In  this  critical  situation,  being 
desirous  to  preserve  the  lives  of  a  mjm!>ci;  of  our  brave  fellows, 
•    who  still  held  out,  I  sent  a  flag  to  them^  and  agreed  with  the 
commanding  officer  of  the  enemy,  that  they  should  be  surren- 
dered prisoners  of  war,  on  condition  of  being  protected  from  the 
savages,  allowed  to  retain  their  private  property,  aM  having 
their^side  arms  returned  to  Ihem.     It  is  impossible  for  me  to  aa.- 
certain  with  ceriliinly  the  loss  \ye  have  sustain-  d  in  this  actijm. 
from  the  impraeiicability  of  .tnowing  the  number  whp  have  w^^h 
their  escajpe.-        .  ^ 


i- 


■■'"^.. 


APPENDIX. 


7» 


«  Tliirty-five  officers,  and  about  four  hundred  atid  eighty-se- 
ren  non-commissioned  olHicers  and  privatesi  are  prisooeM  of  war. 
Our  loss  in  killed  is  considerable.  However  unfortunate  may 
seem  the  affair  of  ye^erdny,  I  am  flattered  by  a  belief,  that  no 
material  error  is  chargeablp  upon  myself,  and  that  still  less  cen- 
'flure  is  deserved  by  the  troops  I  had  the  honor  of  commanding. 

«  With  the  exception  of  that  portion  of -our  force  which  was 
thrown  into  disorder,  no  troops  have  ever  behaved  with  more 
4]etermined  intrepidity  • 

« I  have  the  honor  to  be,  with  high  respect,  your  obedient 

•servant, 

"JAMES  WINCHESTER, 

•  "  Brig,  6enl.  U.  S.  Jrmtj. 

"  Hon.  Secretary  at  War.".  • 

«  The  Indians  have  still  a  few  prisoners  in  their  possession', 
which  I  have  reason  ta  hope  will  bp  given  up  to  colonel  Proc- 
ter at  Sandwich.  ^  . 

^' JAMES  WINCHESTtm, 

^^  Brij;.  Gen.  U.  S.  .llriwj,-\ 


^^  Fort  George,  Upper  Canada, 

*'^  nth  February,' iSi^. 

"On  the  23d  ultimol  had  the  honor  of  communicating  to  yonr 
iixcelk.ney  the  result  of  the  action  at  BVencl^own,  on  the  river 
Ruisin,  the  i>r  ;eding  day.  I  have  it  now  ii.  my  power  to  trans- 
mit to  you  a  Miore  detailed  account  of  that  transaction,  t"oget)ier 
Mi.h  a  more  minute  statement  of  our  Toss.  A  list  a"  Vllled, 
wounded  and  ini^isin*,  is. herewith  enclosed.  The  attack  upoh 
our  eamo  was  commenced  about  6  o'clock  in  the  morning,  by  & 
heavy  fire  of  small  a»m9,  together  with  the  discharge  of  six  pie- 
ces of  artillery,  dii'ected  immediately  at  our  lines,  and  the  hoii- 
ses  and  terapurary  breast-work,  from  behind  which  a  partioivof 
oiW  troops  were  engaged  wil)»  the  enpmy.    Early  in  the  action  a 


-fmiliiiBtiliiliTi 


h 


■i 


2^  APPilNDIX. 

charge  was  made  b,  the  asHailanU  ;  but  the  fire  from  our  lines 
^a»  80  intense,  that  they  were  quickly  compelled  to  re'ire..     _ 
«  In  this  charge,  the  4tst  regiment  of  British  regulars  princi- 
pally  suffered,  their  loss  during  the  «harge,  and  in  the  subse- 
Lnt  engagement,  being  very  considerably-.    Out  of  300  of  those 
troops,  about  30  fell  dead  upon  the  field, and  90  or  100  mounded 
were  removed  from  khe  ground.    It  is  impossible  to  statewUU 
accuracy,  the  number  of  Canadian  militia  and  Indians,  vhieh 
was  either  killed  or  wounded  during  the  engagement  j  ...  could 
however  not  be  small,  having  received  for  three  or  four  hours 
ihv  constant  fire  of  our  musquetry  and  riflemen,  from  the  breast- 
Mcrk  under  which  they  were  for     d.    The  action  had  endured 
about  a  quarter  of  an   hour,  wnen  the  right  division  ot  our 
troops,  who  were  less  secured  by  a  brcast-work,  and  exposed  to 
a  heavy  fire  from  a  body  of  Indians  and  militia,  who  had  pos- 
sessed themselves  of  some  out-houses  within  their  reach,  were 
oblitred  to  retreat  from  their  lines  in  the  encampment,  for  the 
nuvpose  of  occupying  ground  less  exposed.    This  retreat  being 
discovered  hr  the  enemy,  the  whole  Indian  force,  together  with 
a  portion  of  the  militia,  bore  down  upon  them  w^th  redoubled 
violence,  and  prevented,  by  their  superiority  of  numbers,  and  the 
severity  of  their  fi...,  the  practicability  of  ever  again   torming 
this  portion  of  our  troops  in  order  of  battle.     It  was  from  this 
division  that  onr  principalloss  was  sustained,  few  indeed  hav- 
i«-  escaped.    Every  effort  was  in  vain  employed  to  torn,  them 
inL  some  order  of  action,  as  affaidiiig  the  only  mean  of  either 
repelling  the  pursuers,  or  regaining  the  temporary  breast-work, 
from  behindw  fiich  the  -emaining  part  of  onr  troops  still  gallant- 
ly  defended  themselves ;  bi.t  every  exarlion  was  in  vain  em- 
ployed, and  the  verv  fc^  who  survived  of  the  party,  surrender- 
ed as  prisoners  of  war.  .  • 
•«Our  loss  in  tl.is  acH<m  will  be  ascertained  by  the  list  tieve- 
:        with  enclosed.    Among  the  killed,  1  have  to  lameut  seve  al  br«.-« 
aod  valuable  officers,  some  of  whom  hari  distingiishedthemMlve*^ 

in  the  action  of  the  evening  of  the  18th,   ami   fell  on  the2.'d, 

while  unavailingly  engaged  in  rallying  the  t.:o.pswh..retrc.'od 

•    in  disortkr  from  ibe  lines.    Among  those,  the  loss  of  co  ouel 

JoUn  AUen  ami  major  Elijah  M'Clanuahan,  is  to  be  particularly 

^regrettea,   a^   also   captain   John   H.    Wcolfolk,  one  of   my 


''I 


APPENDIX. 


8i 


j;..  e,ery  possMe  eierlion  was  emplojcd  i  the,  "'■'""'1 "" '" 
the  dSe  of  their  respective  dutie..  While  I  regret  the  fa  e 
rf  Me  ?h.  fell  upon  'hi,  oeea.io»,  I  -houla  ■!«  '"J-  -  '» 
pa«over,  without  aotioe,  the  few  P^''^"' '»  *"  ^„*X'. 
who  were  fortunate  enough  to  .urvlv.  them.  T.  '«''"°»°'"" 
Jonel  L  wi,,  who  eommanded  on  the  i3th,  and  to  eM-'-"  J"™" 
O  ton,  m,'  aid-de-eamp,  who  al|e«ded  n,,  person  on  th^heW 
„y  thank.  ..e  partieularly  due,  for  the.r  prompt  and  wllUug 

exertion  during  every  period  of  t'"'  «""«""•  „  .„,_i„a  Heir 
"On  the  offleers  and  .oldie™  who  bravely  niaintainea  tncir 
.round  in  he  temporary  fortiBea.ion,  too  n.ueh  P™—;""'^' 
talowed.  Assailed  hy  number.  greaUy  supenor,  supported  by 
^ixlee..f  artillery  eons.an.ly  employed  they  «a  «n.l,  de- 
r.ded  themselves  with  .mall  arms  alone,  for  nearly  lo..  hour. 

■"^r^rtlp""tr  behaved  with' mere  eool  and  determined 
Wavfr.      Fr  m  the  e.*.mandlns  offieer  down  to  the  private  so^ 
^Hhere  »a,  seareely  a  single  abandonment  „t  duty  an 
|»s.  when  their  ammunition  was  nearly  ""'""f '  """u  f^  ™ 
aed  b,  the  enemj,  greatly  superior  .n  »»■»"•  "f 'J  *J  "^H. 
,f  war,  surrendered  with  a  relue.anee  rarely  to  be  f""»^  «»  " 
liHr  o-easions.     The  offieer;  eommandins  w  the  ^'"^  T^' 

•  Z  leut  ere  Ballird  an  1  Jame, ;  brigade  «,ajor  James 
ton,  K.eii.y,meuHo.,  and  auart-. -master  Pol- 
Oar,  ard,  adjutant  Jo5m  M.  M  CxlU.  f "^JJ^^t  ^.^h  rreat  gal- 
Sard  Keen ;  they  defended  thomsoiyes  I.  the  la  t  ^v^^h  br      S 

•  lantry,  and  merit  my  warmest  gratitude,  as  wel    m  th.,  yiS^^e'^ 

nraise  "f  their  co'i^try.  .  l^.    ' 

^  '  With  sentiment,  pf  the  high'  .t  rc«peet„  I  au,  «ir,  your  obe, 

4ient  servattt,  .  .      .       .       «.    ^yi!^  CHESTER, 

«  Brigadier  Gi^neral  V.  <Sf.  ^Arm^. 
"TUeHon  *c§e£ret?ryavVN  T.WasbingtonCHy,  J.SJ^ 

h 


an 


^Si9 


fi 


If '■ '.' 
I"     I 


•APPENDIX. 

ro.j 


^N  EXTRACT  J'ROM  THE  CERTiFiCATE  OF  CAP- 
TAIN R.BLEDSOE. 

«  I  further  certify,  that  on  the. morning  of  the  33d  Ja* 

iliiary,  1  saw  general  Winchester  on  the  lines  in  the  rear  of  my 
company,  {I  was  then  acting  as  a  captain)  before  a  single  gim 
was  fired  at  the  enemy  from  it—and  1  helieve  that  the  enemy 
approached  nearly  the  whole  line,  at  the  same  tinte.  But  fur- 
ther, that  owing  to  my  compatfy's  being  parlialiy  coverod  by 
Ajolonel  Wells's  command,  it  was  not  so  early  exposed  to  the  ene- 
my as  some  others  were. 

(Signed)  "R.BLEDSOE." 


rP'j  ..  •  • 

EXTRACTS  FROM  THE  STATEMENT  OF  COLONEL 
RICHARD  DAVENFOtiT. 

"  In  September         ?,  1  think  the  18th  of  that  month,  gene^ 
val  Winchester  at  Fort  Wayne.    The  army  was  thea 

lying  at  that  pla  J  under  the  command  of  major  general 

Harrison.  On  the  19th  a  general  onier  was  issued,  assigning  .• 
the  command  of  the  troops  to  general  Winch^  .tec  The  language 
in  the  order  was  such,  relative  to  the  charpct".- of  general  Win- 
chester, as  a  gentleman  and  military  imn.  as  «^  have  satisfied 
any  one  who  could  have  entertained  any  apyrehcnsionsupon  this 
subject.  But  as  soon  as  it  was.  i>nderslood  by  the  volunteers, 
who  composed  a  very  great  part  of  the  troops  tlio-  at  Fort 
Wf^jnie,  considerable  murmuring  was  expressed,  and  much  dis- 
satisfAction  appeared  amongst  them.  From  what!  could  leai"i 
from  the  officers,  it  was  for  no  other  reason  than  that  Winche? 
ter  was*  regular  oflicer.  I  was  then  a  major  inthe  irth  regi- 
ment U.  S.  infantry,  andbeing  well  acquainted  with  nearly  all 
the  field  ottiecrs  bdongiug  to  the  KenJueky  troops,  they  fre- 
quently spoke  of  the  dis'salisfaction  of  the  soldiers  in  consequence 
of  the  change  of  commanders.  This  difference  in  sentiment,  in 
my  opinion,  was  produced  by  the  circumstance,  that  one  was  ^ 


,-tif 


APPENDIX, 


da 


serviog  for  popularity,  tlie  oth?r  for  lii»  country.    [Here  major 
Davenport  notices  the  march  of  the.  army  to  Defiance.    And  af^ 
ter  its  arrival  at  the  ifttter  place,  mentions  the  pircumstance  of 
his  having  been  confined  a  considerable  time  by  severe  illness, 
and  proceeds]^^ After  being  about  a  few  days,  1  was  somewhat 
BBrprised  to  hear  a  different  sentiment  expressed  by  many  cha- 
r-cters  belonging  to  the  army,  concerning  general  Winchester. 
All  the  prejudice  excited  against  him,  seemed  to  have  beeachan- 
ged  into  respect.    And  the  change,  in  sentiment,  to  have  been 
produced  by  his  regular  and  uniform  conduct. 
■  « I  remained  under  the  command  of  general  Winchester  until 
the  32d  of  December,  at  which  time  I  left  the  army  at  Camp 
Miami,  No.  3.    In  consequence  of  t he  objections  which  had  been 
made  to  general  Winchester  by  soine  of  the  officers  as  their  com- 
manding general,  and  of  the  displeasure  expressed  by  the  volun- 
teers, I  was  more  particular  in  6bserving  the  movements  of  the 
army,  than  I  should  have  been,  had  nothing  been  said  to  me  res- 
pecting  this  displeasure  at  his  taking  command  of  the  uorlh- 
western  army.    But  so  far  from  discovering  any  thing  like  a  de- 
reliction of  (luty,  in  every  instance  I  observed  a  conaant  care 
for  the  safety  of  his  troops,  and  industry  to  avert  the  privations 
to  which  they  were  frequently  subjected.     And  never  ou any  oa- 
casion  did  1  see  him  deviatiug  fron-  Lis  duty  as  commanding^ 

general. 

(Signed)      . 


w 


" RICIl'D.  DAYENPQRT", 


V* 


COPY  OF  A  LETTER 

From  Captain  Eastland,  late  of  Kentucky,  to  Genl.  Winchester. 
•  '    *ij>rashville,  July,  i3i7. 

"  In  answer  to  your  communication  requesting  a  statement  o^ 
faces,  with  which  you  were  some  time  since  advised  T  was  ac- 
quainted, haying  relation  to  the  conduct  of  mHJoi'  general  WiL- 
lianj  Henry  Harrison,  as  tonnicted  w'itU  the  disaster*  of  the  left, 
ving  of  the  north-^yestern  army;  I  reply  .^ 


,«ft-^- 


.4^'f/^: 


^'-i^',-"*"*^'. 


If 


ft-  APPENDIX. 

..  My  .l.e»lian  «a,  «r.t  .rro.te,!  by  Ifce  officioa.  «»"-'"«««'' 
IH.rmon  »e«r  Fraukforl,  Kentucky,  id  Aiigusl,  19131, 

*l,n.. /«-,». four  »rn.»,  »l"ch  »h„»M  hove  n,ad«  ev^ 

IL  "il  «f  a^l-iU-n  an<l  iatrigue,  "hieh  never  e.n  be  con- 
„°  eted  wUb  n.m.a,-y  !.«.-  or  ,ineere  .kvo.lon  •»•'">  P;»'""'^J^ 
"f  .4  country,  1  notd  the  .erle,  of  cire«m3lan.e.  rel.t.ng  t. 

t!ii>  maii,  "lii'h  f""""" '—  ,     ,  ,  i  „  „.  it  n»  loss 

L":::— .  .bo.  ..op,  i^r---- -f^-'-i^r:; 

:.  a„..'uo,u,peeUns  old  governor,  Scot.,  «.,  «^»'   » J^;', 

fro,n  ofliee-a.  a  moment  «hen  every  avenue  to  b.»  '""'"' 

;;  „  ad  In,  feeling,  were  ekVa.ed  b,  .be  r»r..ns  eonS".  la- 

:  e  ki.  friend,   this  fatal  commission  was  oblained—lbit 

;:;r:l*d'::t:cy:f  major  general. biebunp.^^^^^^^ 

ITir::  :  ;  edLclnsivcly  .0  me,  tbat  .be  en.  tv« 
ev  y  unswi.'. ''.=  8-eral,  no  matter  bow  eon.empU  le  bo 
\Vilh  this  opinion  of  .be  man,  I  conceived  it  my  (^"Ij, 
'^ZjTo.rZLlM  sin,..ion,  t.  be  vigilant  in  an  .bser- 
„  of  1  is  °onlT«_a  conduct  -vbieb  b.s  been  fraugbt  «,  b 
i;':.i.:  to  v:.:r,eU-,..,d  tbe  ..ost  unbar,>y  cou.e,ue.ees  to  .be 

"n:  b':'!,-  lirir^nieriug  into  a  particular  detail  of  bl.  eon- 

-rt^r^ ;:  ;l  .:::^  "nvH'" '  «rps  if  vti„.tcer 


APVENDIX. 


96 


«•„„  l,in.  »;.h  .agon.  -^'"-' '"'XtS;  »a  lul 
marched  «i,h  .h.  ».lv'«ee  of  Hje  «':7j"  f  J*,,,,  ^eler- 

,e,.,  a.  .veil  I.,  ''. ~'-''.f  "/^^^^  ^ X  W  -IreaUd  bo- 

T:  :,  °f  rcnll    «eLin  advance,  ?a  hundred  mile,  north- 
;       flbv  burning  a  few  hut.,  a«  destroying  .orae  eorn, 

'''"rScn-al  Harrison  re«n,.,i,hed  the  eontnt.nd  of  .1.« 
„„Vlo  yon  at  Fort  Wayne,  „lth  .o  n,aeh  apparent  .at,.fae- 
?•  .?U  Jas  well  understood,  llmt  I.e  engag'^d  to  return  to  S  . 
M  ;;%  and  '^ausc  tl,e  troop,  halted  there  to  advance  a,  well 
Mary  s,  an  „f  every  description,  of  whieh  the  armj 

as  to  forward  supplies  ol  every  V  ^^  g^,___._ 

•  .    "->  ",""■"-' r^oh  of  Ip  temWr,  1  next  day,  al,o„t  noon. 

^"•'  "fat  St  Mar  's      In   ead  of  in-mediately  despatching  .he 

■      rr,  and  suS,    s  he  had  solemnly  engaged,  he  mounted  a 

troops  »"'''""''";;,„;      ,h,  ,,„„p,,  exhorted  them  to  patn- 

17'flne      'r      tir  Believin/the  troops  now  firmly  wo- 
otism,  lirmness  o  ^^  ^^  ^^  j_^,^„  „|,^ 

r:r:e~^ar  le  ..-nre  .,  U.e  omeer.    wh^ 

stated  in  suhstance,  that  the  ;J>7 -j  ^     ^ /claJde, 

"""rTf  "T/d  ^auhfy  rjld  he  cUlrdr-'by  no  other  .a„. 
'got;^o  .  vtd  hla,ag.d  the  business,  .hat  that  disr... 


8^ 


APPENDIX. 


peclfiiJ  and  niiitiiious  instrnment  would  certainly  liave  receiveJf 
the  sanction  of  some  of  lire  officers,  had  it  not  been  reiiolutely 
discounienanccd   by  colonel   Barbec  and  many  others  of  high 
rank.     At  length,  findios;  his  plan  in  part  abortive,  on  Friday 
the  25th  of  September,  he  ordered   colonel  Jennings,  with  his 
regiment,  thirty  miles  in  advance  towards  Detance — tiwrc.  to  /m/f, 
BUILD   A  BLOCKHOUSE,  AND    AWAIT    HIS    FUR- 
THEKOUDKRRi    Why  this  halt,  when   it  was  known  yoo 
were  on  a  hostile  soil,  ami  without  sspplrcs?  The  object  wag, 
in  my  opinion,  as  glaring  as  the- unclouded  splendor  of  a  meri- 
dian snn  1  Your  troops  were  to  be  starved — a  mutiny  wns  to  bo 
excited  in  your  camp — and,  if  not  destroyed  by  an  ent-my,  you 
wfere  to  be  compelled  to  a  retrograde  movement.     The  left  wing 
ol'  the  noit1»«we>iierri  army  vras  to  be  thrown,  by  misery  and  mis- 
foitu.ies,  into  mutiny  aJ«d  rebellion — that  this  saviour  of  his 
country  might  redeem  it— and  obtain  the  undisputed  command  !. 
This  language,  sir,  ml|%e  considered  too  bold  and  decisive,  b/ 
the  luke-warm  reactoi*»5:fiut  vk'hen  memory  brings  ihto  view  the 
sanguinary  catastrophe  which  I  am  <  invinced  was  the  result  of 
an  intrigningjealousy,  indignation  and  cofllenipt  for  demagogues 
arc  aroused  anew.    You  cannot  forget,  sir,  that  en  my  return 
from  Fort  Jennings,  whither  you  had  despatched  me,  in  compa- 
uy  with  captain^Villiam  Garrard,  to  ascertain  the  cause  of  tho 
detention  of  supplies,  I  told  you  whatl  now  do — that  I  advised 
you  of  the  charueter  of  general  Harrison,  and  assured  you  he 
was  your  covert  aod  sul)tle  cnCmy  ;  and  that  it  was  his  sole  aim 
to  ruin  you.     Wuuld  to  God,  I  had  been  enabled  at  that  period 
to  infuse  into  your  mind  a  suspicion  of  his  baseness — and  that  I 
could  have  shaken  youir  confidence  in  the  fidelity  and  honor  of 
a  man,  who  Mas  accessary,  though  perhaps  without  penjejving 
it  at  the  time,  to  an  evenl  which  will  stain  the  pages  of  history. 
Whenever  1  think  of  tbe  situation  of  the  left  wing  of  the  army 
at  Defiance — when  1  reflect  upon  what  might  shortly  have  been 
the  consequences  of  this  mutineiis  stratagem,  had  not  the  friends 
of  general  Harrison  procured  him   the  command  in  ehief,  my 
blood  is  chilled  with  horror.     On  the  morning  of  the  2d  of  Oc- 
tober, a  disposition  to  revolt   was  clearly  manifested  in  colonel 
Allen's  regiment.     The  sensations  which   this  disposition  pro- 
duced  in  tl>e  mind  and  feelings  of  that  gallant  officer,  lunguag* 


f.nif^ 


APPENDIX. 


8? 


ts  tco  feebltj  to  •leseribc.  For.  who  that  saw,  can  ever  forget, 
the  conflicling  passions  vhicli  alternately  reigneil  iii  the  bosom 
of  that  hero,  when  he  miunted  the  breast-work  to  address  his 
regiment.  Pride,  passion,  mortification,  shut  up  every  avenue 
to  utterance,  until  the  silent  and  manly  tear  trickled  down  the 
soldier's  cheek,  and  gave  vent  to  the  indignant  feelings  of  his 
heart.  Allen  knew  to  what  source  the  contagion  of  revolt  poin- 
ted ;  and  had  this  man  surviveil  the  battle  of  Frenchtown,  yon 
would  have  been  spared  the  trouble  of  appealing  from  historical 
romance  to  historical  truth. 

"  Soon  after  the  circumstances  which  I  have  Just  related 
transpired,  I  returned  into  the  state  of  Kentucky,  leaving  the 
army  in  its  encampments  near  the  ruins  of  Defiance.     In  passi 
ing  St  Mary's,  the  ohjccrs  at  that  post  reeajpituliited  all  that  I 
liave  detailed,  concerning  the  mutinous  ppper,  w^iich  was  prof- 
•fered  for  their  signatures.     From   my  iibscrvatinhs  during  my 
stay  at  St.  Mary's,  and  on  my  rciui-n  from  thtiifie  to  Cincinnati, 
I  have  not  the  smallest  doubt,  that  hav)"  there  been  u  dispositidn* 
connected  with  a  corresponding  exertion,  on  the  part  of  general 
Harrison,  the  left  wing  of  the  north-western  army  could,  with 
ease  and  facility,  have  been  furnished  with  a  suMcieucy  of  eve- 
ry descriptiou  of  supplies,  to  have  justified  active  operations  at 
Q,  very  early  period.     In  this  I  am  even  supported  by  the  gene- 
ral's concurrent  opinion.     When  he  arrived  at  Defiance  with 
the  supercedeas  commission,  after  as^su^Ung  the  commaird  &'c.  he  ' 
assured  the  troops,  in  an  address,   that  there   wore  then  at  St. 
lilary's  600.000  rations,  and  abundance  more  daily  arriving, 
which  would,  with  the  means  of  transportation  then  within  his 
enntrol,  enable  him  to  supply  the  army  plentifully;  and  that 
;  additional  reinforcements,   which  he  should  order  on  immedi- 
ately, would  enable  the  American  army  in  thirty  days  trium- 
phantly to  pnt.r  Detroit,  and  again  to  plant  the  cagie  upon  its 
ramparts.     He  also  stated,  that  be  had  received  information,. 
.    IVom  a  source  in  which  he  could  place  every  reliance,  that  the 
army  which  retreated  before  you  from  Fort  Wayne,  was  nearly 
all  the  opposing  fqrcc  which  the  enemy  gouldbring  into  the  field 
for  some  timej  at  least,  not  before  your  command  could  reaek 
Detroit.     Can  it  be  believed  that  an  American  officer,  having 
jthe  fertile  and  populous  state  of  Ohio  in  bis  rear,  and  being  in 


A 


^^  ''iP^r!^ 


^^^ti^ 


88 


APPENDIX, 


regretted,  thai  im»  man  unfortunate  wt    it 

h.\.d  .he  ..pacity  t.  e„„.e.^^  How  »»  __^^^^       _^ 

for  the  Amenmn  arms,  thai  J""  «•■"  "         .       ,         „,  ad- 

vance,  and  before  the  umim. ,,  ,.«•     ^  enterprise  ! 

forcement^,  made  it  an  '»^^-- f  j  ^"^^"^/the  command 
«In  forty-eigUt  hours  after  h.s  '^""""P""  ,      ,^„,  ^e 

remained  one  day  5  from  t'^'-"««  "  ^  .„^„  t,,,  interior  of 

„,ained  two  day«,  and  t-m  thence  v-^^^^         ^^^  ^.^^^^^  ^^^ 

Ohio.  Had  l.e  rema.n.d  «^\1  "^"y/^^^:,,^,,,,  and  quarter- 
paid  the  neee«sury  aUc«tu.n  ^^'^^  ^^T^^^^^^  of  himself 
Liter's  depa|tm.«tB,  mstead  or  'J*'^-",;;''^^^  ^.j^.^ed  hi« 
inditrerentp3fc«orihee«in(ry    he  m.'^    1^  ^^  ^^^^^^ 

pledge  to  the  Icit  wing  .n  ume  ^  u^  P--  ^^,,„.,^ 

have  enabled  those  ^'^;«  "5«' ^;,y^„  K.i.in,  to  have  fulfilled 
are  now  whitening  en  t"«  l'»^  "^"^^  «tump  address  to  the 
tae  promise  he  made  to  h.s  «  ^'f;;;/  ^^  ^  if ,,ai»  upon  the 
army,  that  the  A-er.cauYl    uld  p  a.U  h   e      ^^^^  ^_  ^^^^^^_ 

,a.parts  of  Detro  t.     «!;^; .-;,;;,,"  ^  merely  to  ol.serve,  .hat 
ther  upon  the  eonduet  «      "  J^,;.;,^  contemplate  w.thatten- 

;:r:A^^xrrth::ee„.eV— - 

demagoi^ue.  ?  .,„fi.:.«iPd  respect,  to  which  your  worth 

«  With  sentiments  of  unleigneu  re»i. 

and  unmerited  injuries  entitle  P^'J'.^jJ^^.J^^^g^ASrLAND.. 

I 


"CUAOI'OXT." 


END. 


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